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I. INTRODUCTION
Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan has stirred controversy since
the Constitution went into effect in 1947. The provision can be inter-
preted as prohibiting Japan from using armed force even in self-defense,
but over time Japan has developed a significant military force that has
expanded in both strength and reach. This expansion has sparked intense
debate about whether or not Japan is in violation of Article 9, and this
debate has raised broader questions about the meaning and vitality of
constitutionalism in Japan. Such controversies have led to calls for re-
vising Article 9, but no amendments have been made to the Constitution
since its adoption. In 2000, however, the Diet established constitutional
research commissions in both the House of Representatives and the
House of Councillors, which have considered all aspects of the Consti-
tution, including the possibility of its revision. The commissions' work
was completed in spring 2005, with each commission issuing a final
report to the Diet.' The political parties are now considering draft
amendments. Formal amendments will be introduced and debated in the
Diet and, assuming consensus is reached, put to a national referendum.
Some speculate that the process will not be completed for several more
years, if ever, but no matter the outcome, these developments represent
an important chapter in Japanese constitutional history in which an
amended Article 9 is a real possibility.
My purpose is to examine the revision debates through the lens of
recent scholarship on constitutional decisionmaking to see what lessons
might be drawn about constitutionalism in Japan and elsewhere. In Part
I, I discuss Article 9's text and interpretation and focus on three contro-
versies: first, Japan's ability to use force to defend itself and the related
issue of the constitutionality of the Japan Self Defense Force (SDF);
second, Japan's ability to engage in collective self-defense, which im-
pacts the state's security relationship with the United States under the
U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Agreement; and finally, Japan's ability to
participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations.
In Part II, I discuss scholarship on constitutions as providing heuris-
tics for decisionmaking and consensus-building. I begin with John Elster
and Cass Sunstein's view of constitutions as a set of precommitment
1. At present, the reports are available only in Japanese. Shugiin Kenpo Ch6sakai
[House of Representatives Constitutional Research Commission], Shugi'in Kenp6 Ch6sakai
H6kokusho [House of Representatives Constitutional Research Commission Report] (Apr.
2005) [hereinafter House of Representatives CRC Final Report]; Sangiin Kenpo Ch6sakai
[House of Councillors Constitutional Research Commission], Nihonkoku Kenp6 ni kan sum
Ch6sa H6kokusho (Apr. 2005) [Report on Research Concerning the Constitution of Japan]
[hereinafter House of Councillors CRC Final Report].
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strategies.2 Elster holds that constitutions function to overcome the
problems of emotion and time-inconsistency in decision-making. Sun-
stein maintains that good constitutions enable societies composed of
different deliberative groups to avoid the pitfalls caused by intra-group
dynamics and the limited pool of arguments available to any given
group, first, by requiring groups to interact with one another and second,
by providing opportunities for compromise through what he calls "in-
completely theorized agreement." Drawing on work from J.M. Balkin,3 I
argue that precommitment strategies and the concepts that enable in-
completely theorized agreement share features common to all heuristic
devices: they are cumulative, multifunctional, and recursive, and they
lead to unintended results. This complicates the decision-making proc-
ess of any society, and one result is that any decisions emerging from a
constitutional process will themselves share these features.
In Part III, I apply this theory to the process and substance of the
Japanese revision debates. First, the debate can be seen as taking place
within and among various deliberative groups comprising Japanese so-
ciety. Second, the formal requirements for amending the Constitution,
combined with features in the Japanese political and social landscape,
require the various groups to interact with one another before final deci-
sions are made. Third, the cumulative, multifunctional, and recursive
features of heuristics are visible in the concepts and arguments being
used in the debate on Article 9. These features make agreement chal-
lenging because of the various deliberative groups' familiarity with the
arguments being made for and against amendments to Article 9. At the
same time, the same concepts could form the basis for incompletely
theorized agreement on key issues. Fourth, the net effect of these cul-
tural tools is that possible solutions to the amendment debate will
undoubtedly solve some problems, yet raise others.
II. ARTICLE 9
A. The Text
Like the rest of the 1947 Constitution, Article 9 is a product of the
Occupation.4 In the aftermath of the Second World War, the Allies were
2. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT,
AND CONSTRAINTS (2000); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITU-
TIONS Do (2001).
3. J.M. BALKIN, CULTURAL SOFTWARE: A THEORY OF IDEOLOGY (1998).
4. Original source material on the history of the 1947 Constitution is available on the
National Diet Library website. National Diet Library, Birth of the Constitution of
Japan, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/index.html. For a history of the constitution, see
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determined to ensure that Japan would never again pose a threat to
peace and security Article 9 provides:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign
right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of
settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph land,
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized.'
The Constitution's preamble has language relevant to Article 9, al-
though there is a dispute over whether it has independent legal force, is
aspiring in nature, or provides the context for the provisions that follow.
There, the Japanese people state they "shall secure for [themselves] and
[their] posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations ...."
They resolve "never again ... [to] be visited with the horrors of war
through the action of government ....." And, they "have determined to
preserve [their] security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of
peace-loving peoples of the world."7
B. Constitutional Controversies
The controversies arising from Article 9 can be grouped into three
related issues. The first concerns Japan's right to use force in its de-
fense, which in turn impacts the constitutionality of the Japanese Self
Defense Force. The second involves Japan's relationship with the United
LAWRENCE W. BEER & JOHN M. MAKI, FROM IMPERIAL MYTH TO DEMOCRACY (2002);
ASHIBE NOBUYOSHI & TAKAHASHI KAZUYUKI, KENP6 [The Constitution] 22-34 (3d ed.
2002); Hideo Otake, Two Contrasting Constitutions in the Postwar World: The Making of the
Japanese and West German Constitutions in FIVE DECADES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
JAPANESE SOCIETY 43, 44-49 (Yoichi Higuchi ed., 2001) [hereinafter FIVE DECADES OF
CONSTITUTIONALISM]; JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN THE WAKE OF
WORLD WAR II 346-404 (1999); KOSEKI SH6ICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN'S POSTWAR CONSTI-
TUTION (Ray A. Moore ed. & trans., 1997).
5. See, e.g., Watanabe Osamu, Remarks before the House of Councillors Constitu-
tional Research Commission, May 7, 2003 in SANGIIN KENP6 CH6SAKAI [HOUSE OF
COUNCILLORS CONSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH COMMISSION], SANGIIN KENP6 CH6SAKAI NI
OKERU SANK6NIN NO KICHOHATSUGEN [BASIC REMARKS OF EXPERTS BEFORE THE HOUSE OF
COUNCILLORS CONSTITUTIONAL RESEARCH COMMISSION] (April 2005) at 278 [hereinafter
House of Councillors CRC Remarks of Experts] (arguing the Allies thought it essential for
international peace and security that Japan never rearm). For a history of Japanese imperial-
ism in Asia and the Pacific, see W.G. BEASLEY, JAPANESE IMPERIALISM 1894-1945 (1987).
6. KENP6 [Constitution], art. 9.
7. Id., preamble.
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States in terms of Japan's ability to engage in collective self-defense.
The third concerns what role, if any, a Japanese armed force should play
in the international security system in general and in UN peacekeeping
operations in particular.' These debates center on government interpreta-
tions of Article 9 because the courts have largely left it to the political
branches to make determinations in this area.9
1. Self-Defense and the SDF
Within a few years of ratification and the birth of the Cold War, in
response to pressure from the United States and with great controversy,
the Japanese government began to interpret Article 9 as allowing Japan
to maintain a self-defense force)0 The Japanese government established
the National Police Reserve in 1950 after North Korea invaded South
Korea. It became the National Safety Force in 1952 and then changed
into the SDF in 1954." Beginning in the 1980s, Japan's armed forces
grew significantly and began to participate in regional military exercises
with the United States.1
2
Today, the SDF has about 240,000 personnel and an annual budget
of close to $50 billion, which is larger in size and spending than Great
Britain's armed forces. 3 Although the SDF is now in its fifth decade,
there has been serious debate throughout this period in Japan about
whether or not the SDF is constitutional. Article 9, paragraph 2 provides
that all "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will
never be maintained."'4 Two interpretations of Article 9 render the SDF
unconstitutional. Under the first, "war," rejected in paragraph 1, means
both offensive and defensive war; therefore, under paragraph 2 no forces
8. Another issue is whether it is consistent with Article 9 for the United States to
maintain military bases in Japan. Further, Article 9 also raises issues concerning the role
Japan can play geographically and militarily in the Pacific. I do not discuss these issues in
great detail in this Article.
9. See infra notes 146, 237-244, and accompanying text.
10. I discuss some of these developments further in Part HI. For a discussion of the
Japanese government's interpretation of Article 9, see Yagi Kazuhiro, Kenp5 9j6 ni kan suru
Seifu no Kaishaku ni Tsuite [Concerning the Government's Interpretation of Article 9 of the
Constitution], JURISTO, Jan. 1-15, 2004, at 68.
11. Jieitaih6 [Self-Defense Force Law], Law No. 165 of 1954. Toshihiro Yamauchi,
Constitutional Pacifism: Principle, Reality, and Perspective in FIVE DECADES OF CONSTITU-
TIONALISM, supra note 4, at 27 (discussing development of the SDF).
12. GLENN D. HOOK & GAVAN MCCORMACK, JAPAN'S CONTESTED CONSTITUTION 17
(2001); PETER J. KATZENSTEIN, CULTURAL NORMS & NATIONAL SECURITY: POLICE AND
MILITARY IN POSTWAR JAPAN 131-38 (1996) (discussing SDF developments from the 1950s
to 1996).
13. Global Security. org, Japan Defense Agency (Boeicho) Japan Self-Defense Force, at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/japan/jda.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2005).
14. KENP6 art. 9, para. 2.
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for either purpose may be maintained." Under the second, "[p]aragraph
1 of Article 9 does not rule out defensive war, but since paragraph 2 for-
bids the possession of force, even defensive war is forbidden ....
Japan is to rely on peaceful means, including diplomacy and the interna-
tional security system, not its own force, when its security is at stake.
Other interpretations of Article 9 permit the use of force in self-
defense. The Japanese government first articulated its present position
when it established the SDF in 1954.17 Paragraph 1 does not expressly
prohibit force for self-defense, which implies that "war potential" in
paragraph 2 means force exceeding a minimum level necessary for self-
defense. Anything at or below that level does not constitute war poten-
tial, and since the SDF is established for this limited purpose, it does not
constitute war potential and therefore is not prohibited by the Constitu-
tion." Both sides of the interpretive debate raise a number of arguments
with varying degrees of persuasiveness, some of which I discuss more
fully in Part M1.9
2. Collective Self-Defense and the U.S.-Japan Security Agreement
The approach used by the Japanese government to justify self-
defense and the SDF impacts Japan's ability to engage in collective self-
defense otherwise permitted under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Collec-
tive self-defense implies a state may use force to defend another state
even though the first state is not being directly attacked. The Japanese
government, however, argues that Article 9, paragraph 1 prevents Japan
from intervening: by its terms Japan renounces the use of force as a
15. Koseki Sh6ichi et al., Peace and Regional Security in the Asia-Pacific, in HOOK &
MCCORMACK, supra note 12, at 92, 111.
16. Id. See also HIGUCHI YOICHI ET AL., I KENPO NY6MON [INTRODUCTION TO THE
CONSTITUTION] 64-66 (1992) (arguing Article 9 prohibits the maintenance of armed forces
for defensive purposes); Kenneth L. Port, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution and the Rule
of Law, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 127, 137-45 (2004) (same); Yamauchi, supra note
11, at 30-33 (same). See also D.C.S. Sissons, The Pacifist Clause of the Japanese Constitu-
tion: Legal and Political Problems of Rearmament, 37 INT'L AFF. 45 (1961) (discussing
various interpretations of Article 9).
17. Meeting of the House of Representatives Committee on the Budget of the 21st
Diet, Dec. 21, 1954 (statement of Hayashi Shflz6) reprinted in WATANABE OSAMu, KENP5
"KAIsEI" NO S6TEN [Points of Contention regarding Constitutional Revision] 518, 519-20
(2002) [hereinafter KENP6 "KAIsEI" NO S6TEN]; House of Councillors CRC Final Report,
supra note 1, at 79.
18. House of Councillors CRC Final Report, supra note 1, at 80. Yamauchi Toshiro
criticizes the government's definition of war potential as circular. YAMAUCHI TOSHIHIRO,
KENP6 TO HEIWA SHUGI [The Constitution and Pacifism] 10 (1998) [Hereinafter KENP6 TO
HEIWA SHUGI]. See also infra text prior to note 237. An earlier interpretation of Article 9 is
that "[slince paragraph 1 ... forbids aggressive war but not defensive war, defensive forces
may be possessed ...." Shichi et al., supra note 15, at I11.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 187-200.
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means of resolving international disputes. Furthermore, the use of force
to defend an ally when Japan has not been directly attacked is inconsis-
tent with the principle of minimum necessary force.2°
The debates over individual and collective self-defense raise ques-
tions about the kind of role Japan may play in its security relationship
with the United States. That relationship forms the backbone of Japan's
security strategy2' and is embodied in the Mutual Security Treaty be-
tween the two countries.22 Throughout the Cold War, it was largely
understood Japan was under the United States' security umbrella and
would serve as a forward base for U.S. military operations in East Asia.
The ending of the Cold War caused Japan to reevaluate that relationship,
but the ties between Japan and the United States have strengthened, in
part because of the threat to Japan posed by North Korea's development
of nuclear weapons and missile technology23 and the emergence of
China as an economic and military power. In 1997, Japan and the United
States issued a new set of guidelines under the treaty that contemplates
Japan will give rearguard support for U.S. military activities, both in the
24
region surrounding Japan and possibly further abroad. This marked the
20. Takami Katsutoshi, Kenp6 Kyujd no "K6tei Kaishaku" o Meguru "16" to "Seiji"
[The "Law" and "Politics" Surrounding the "Official Interpretation" of Article 9 of the Con-
stitution), JURISTO, Jan. 1-15, 2004, at 131, 132. Takami argues this policy is the culmination
of other government pronouncements on the use of force that date back to the 1950s. Id.
21. The Japan Defense Agency has taken the position that:
Japan .. .finds it realistic to establish an impeccable defense system to ensure its
security by continuing alliance with the United States, which possesses immense
military power, and which shares the basic value[s] and idea[1]s called freedom
and democracy, thereby effectively putting [the] war deterrent capability of the
United States to work for ensuring the security of Japan, along with possessing an
appropriate level of defense capability.
Japan Defense Agency, Significance of Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements at
http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index.htm. See also YUTAKA KAWASHIMA, JAPANESE FOREIGN POL-
ICY AT THE CROSSROADS: CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 53-
54 (2003) (advocating a close security relationship with the United States); MICHAEL JONA-
THAN GREEN, JAPAN'S RELUCTANT REALISM: FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES IN AN ERA OF
UNCERTAIN POWER 3 (2001) (same).
22. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, U.S.-Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, 11 U.S.T.
1632 [hereinafter U.S.-Japan Security Treaty]. Article III allows for the presence of U.S.
forces in Japan. See GEORGE R. PACKARD III, PROTEST IN TOKYO: THE SECURITY TREATY
CRISIS OF 1960 (1966) (discussing the renewal of the security treaty).
23. In 1997, North Korea launched a three-stage Taepo-dong ballistic missile over
Japanese airspace. GREEN, supra note 21, at 124.
24. Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, Sept. 23, 1997, available at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html [hereinafter 1997 Guide-
lines]. For a discussion of the constitutionality of the new guidelines under Article 9, see
KENPO TO HEIWA SHUGI, supra note 18, at 45-71; Chris Ajemian, Comment, The 1997 U.S.-
Japan Defense Guidelines Under the Japanese Constitution and Their Implications for U.S.
Foreign Policy, 7 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 323 (1998); Robert A. Fisher, Note, The Erosion of
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first time that Japan's activities under the treaty were not limited to the
Japanese homeland and its territorial waters. Developments since 9/11
have only further strengthened the relationship.25 In the early 1990s, Ja-
pan was severely criticized for refusing to send troops during the 1991
Persian Gulf War even though it made substantial monetary contribu-
tions to the war effort. After 9/11, Japan quickly announced support for
the United States. For instance, it dispatched naval forces to the Indian
26Ocean to provide logistic support for the invasion of Afghanistan. Fur-
thermore, over the past two years, Japan has deployed some 600 ground
troops to participate in humanitarian and reconstruction activities in
Iraq.27 Japan also has agreed to cooperate with the United States in de-
veloping a ballistic missile defense system.
28
Japanese Pacifism: The Constitutionality of the 1997 U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines, 32
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 393 (1999).
25. For a more detailed discussion of these developments, see Ralph A. Cossa & Brad
Glosserman, U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation: Has Japan Become the Great Britain of Asia?
(2005), available at http://www.csis.org/pacfor/issues/v05nO3-report.cfm.
26. Such assistance was authorized by the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law,
passed by the Diet immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Terotaisaku
Tokubetsu Sochi H6, Law No. 113 of 2001. For a discussion of the special measures law and
an assessment of its constitutionality, see Edward J.L. Southgate, Comment, From Japan To
Afghanistan: The U.S. -Japan Joint Security Relationship, The War On Terror And The Igno-
minious End Of The Pacifist State? 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1599 (2003). For a discussion of
Japan's response to terrorist attacks, see Liberal Democratic Party, National Defense Divi-
sion, Policy Research Council, Establishing the Security Policy of Japan and the Japan-U.S.
Alliance, Mar. 23, 2001, at 6-7.
27. Focus on a Changing Japan: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Asia and the Pac.
of the House Comm. on International Relations, 109th Cong. 9 (2005) (Statement of Thomas
U. Berger). See Iraku ni Okeru Jind6 Fukk6 Shien Katsud6 Oyobi Anzen Kakuho Shien Ka-
tsud6 no Jisshi ni Kansuru Tokubetsu Sochi H6 [Special Measures Law Concerning
Activities for Humanitarian Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq as well as Activities for Secu-
rity Assurance], Law No. 137 of 2003; Iraku Nanmin Kyiien Kokusai Heiwa Ky6ryokutai no
Sochi nado ni Kansuru Seirei [Order Concerning Measures for the International Peace Coop-
erative Group for the Relief of Iraqi Refugees], Cabinet Order No. 123 of 2003. For a
description of Japanese activities in Iraq, see Japan Defense Agency, For the Future of Iraq,
available at http://www.jda.go.jp/e/top/main.htm.
28. MICHAEL SWAINE, RACHEL SWANGER, & TAKASHI KAWAKAMI, JAPAN AND BAL-
LISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (2001) (discussing cooperation between the United States and Japan
in developing a ballistic missile defense system); Hideaki Kaneda, Japan's Ballistic Missile
Defense in Japan-U.S. Security Relations, 3 ISSUES & INSIGHTS 33 (2003) (same). Terrorism
and other perceived threats to national security have also led Japan to pass legislation that
centralizes power in times of national emergency. In 2003, the Diet passed an Emergency
Measures Law: Buryoku K6geki Jitai nado ni okeru Wagakuni no Heiwa to Dokuritsu narabi
ni Kuni oyobi Kokumin no Anzen no Kakuho ni kansuru H6ritsu [Law Concerning the Main-
tenance of Our Country's Peace and Independence and the Safety of the Country and the
Citizenry in the Event of Armed Attack and the Like], Law No. 79 of 2003. This legislation
sets out procedures under which the Japanese government will respond to an armed attack
from outside Japan, imminent armed attack, or an increase in tensions that may result in
armed attack and the circumstances under which the SDF can be deployed in response.
Amendments in 2004 allow for similar responses in situations that do not constitute an armed
attack but nevertheless threaten public safety. Buryoku K6geki Jitai nado ni okeru Kokumin
[Vol. 27:55
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The expanded reach of Japan under the Mutual Security Agreement
Guidelines and Japan's deployment of forces to the Indian Ocean and to
Iraq, even if limited to logistical support, reconstruction, and humanitar-
ian assistance, raise issues under Article 9. Although Japan has strategic
interests in the Middle East, it is not obvious Japan's activities in the
region constitute self-defense-let alone adhere to the minimum force
necessary for self-defense. It can be argued Japan is achieving indi-
rectly, through a third country, what it cannot achieve directly under
Article 9 by supporting nations that use armed force to resolve interna-
tional disputes. The interpretive problems raised by Article 9 will
become even more acute as the United States urges Japan to play a more
active role in the security relationship. Sakamoto Kazuya, for example,
asserts that any such expansion of Japan's role requires it to engage in
collective self-defense, at least in Japanese territory, on the high seas,S 29
and in international airspace. Furthermore, some in Japan press for
stronger ties with other Asian countries, as those relationships are con-
sidered useful in and of themselves and can prevent Japan from relying
too heavily on its relationship with the United States for its security.3 ° If
regional security arrangements are to be a viable option, Japan's credi-
bility as a partner in those accords must rest on the legality of collective
self-defense under the Constitution.3'
3. UN Peacekeeping Operations and Participation in UN Institutions
Calls for Japanese participation in United Nations peacekeeping op-
erations go back as far as 1960, when some Japanese leaders regretted
that Japan did not assist in UN operations in the Congo.32 In 1992, the
no Hogo no tame no Sochi ni kansuru H6ritsu [Law Concerning Measures for the Protection
of the Citizenry in the event of Armed Attack and the Like], Law No. 112 of 2004; Buryoku
K6geki Jitai ni okeru Gaikoku Guny6hin nado no Kaijoyus6 no Kisei ni kansuru Horitsu
[Law Concerning the Regulation of the Marine Transport of Foreign Munitions and the like
in the event of Armed Attack], Law No. 116 of 2004.
29. Sakamoto Kazuya, The Japan-United States Security Treaty and the Right to Col-
lective Self-Defense 1 ISSUES & INSIGHTS 50 (2001). See also Liberal Democratic Party,
National Defense Division, Policy Research Council supra note 26, at 8-10 (discussing the
need for Japanese participation in collective self-defense and criticizing the Government's
interpretation of Article 9).
30. See, e.g., Remarks Before the House of Councillors Research Commission, June 4,
2003 (Daii Akai), in SANGIIN KENP6 CH6SAKAI NI OKERU K6JUTSUNIN NO KICH6HATSUGEN
[Basic Remarks of Persons Appearing at Public Hearings of the House of Councillors Consti-
tutional Research Commission] 55, 56 (April 2005), available at http://www.sangiin.go.jp/
Japanese/kenpou/houkokusyo/pdf/koujutunin.pdf (arguing that over the long term, Japan's
security interests lie in strengthening relationships with states in Asia and that the U.S.-Japan
Security Agreement might hinder those relationships).
31. House of Representatives CRC Final Report, supra note 1, at 309.
32. See JAPAN'S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE FINAL REPORT 97 (John M.
Maki trans. & ed., 1980) [hereinafter JAPAN'S CoMMISSlON ON THE CONSTITUTION].
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Diet enacted legislation permitting Japan to join in UN peacekeeping
• 33
operations. Since then the SDF has participated in at least eight opera-
tions conducted by the United Nations. 14 Amendments to the
Peacekeeping Operations Law in 2001 permit the SDF to monitor dis-
armament activities, to be stationed in and patrol buffer zones, and to
collect and dispose of abandoned weapons. The amendments also ex-
panded the set of situations in which the SDF may itself use weapons."
These developments marked a major shift in Japan's view of the
SDF and the role that Japan should play in international affairs and laid
the groundwork for expansions in its relationship with the United
36States. Yet, the constitutionality of an SDF role in UN activities is de-
batable. On the one hand, nothing in the Constitution directly prohibits
participation in international operations. Peacekeeping activities are cir-
cumscribed and by definition enjoy the support of the international
community.37 Peacekeeping forces are to use armed force only when
they are under direct attack. On the other hand, for the SDF to place it-
self in situations where the use of force may be necessary seems
inconsistent with the principle of minimum necessary force, particularly
when Japan's security interests are low. Under another theory, since Ar-
ticle 9 represents the terms by which Japan was allowed to rejoin the
community of nations, while it may be appropriate for the international
33. Kokusai Reng6 Heiwa Iji Katsud6 nado ni Taisuru Ky6roku ni Kansuru H6ritsu
[Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the Like],
Law No. 79 of 1992.
34. These operations are the United Nations Peacekeeping Observer Force (in the
Golan Heights), the United Nations Angola Verifications Mission II, the United Nations Ob-
server Mission in El Salvador, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, the
United Nations Operation in Mozambique, the United Nations Operation in Somalia II, the
United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, and the United Nations Mission of
Support in East Timor. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, DIPLOMATIC BLUEBOOK
138 (2003).
35. Kokusai Rengo Heiwa Iji Katsud6 nado ni Taisuru Ky~roku ni Kansuru Suru
H6ritsu no Ichibu o Kaisei H6ristsu [Law Amending a Portion of the Law Concerning Coop-
eration for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and the Like], Law No. 157 of 2001.
See also International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, Kokusai Heiwa Ky6ry6ku H6 no
Ichibu Kaisei (Heisei 13 nen 12 gatsu) ni Tsuite [Concerning Revisions to a Portion
of the International Peace Cooperation Law (Dec. 2001)], available at http://www.pko.
go.jp/PKOJ/relatedbill/revisionl 3.html (describing revisions).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 20-31.
37. For example, Onuma Yasuaki argues under international law, when a country uses
force to resolve an international dispute, it is acting in its own self-interest. In contrast, ac-
tions sanctioned by the United Nations are a police function and take on a public character,
even if such activities involve the use of force. It follows in his view that Article 9 does not
prohibit the SDF's participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations or its coopera-
tion with a military force operating under UN authority. Remarks before the House of
Councillors Constitutional Research Commission, Mar. 3, 2004 (Onuma Yasuaki) in House
of Councillors CRC Remarks of Experts, supra note 5, at 365, 368.
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community to use force in connection with peacekeeping operations, it
is not appropriate for Japan to do so.
Article 9 may stand as an impediment to Japan's ability to play a
greater role in the United Nations. For years, Japan has wanted a perma-
nent seat on the Security Council, believing its economic power and•• 38
participation in world affairs merits such a recognition. Some argue
Article 9 prevents Japan from becoming a permanent member of the
Security Council because its ambiguous language makes it unclear
whether Japan would be able to meet its responsibilities as a permanent
member. For instance, Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura has as-
serted: "The Constitution should be amended to clearly position Japan's
international peace-building activities .... The Constitution should be
reformed because it is better to ensure that no confusion will arise when
Japan fulfills its duties as a permanent member ... ""
In. CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSENSUS
There appears to be a consensus among segments of Japanese soci-
ety that a confluence of trends-Japan's emergence as an economic
power, its greater participation in Pacific and world affairs, its aspiration
to a more important role in the United Nations, the severe criticism it
received when it did not participate directly in the Persian Gulf War,
pressures from the United States to expand its security relationship by
putting SDF personnel in harm's way, developments on the Korean pen-
insula, the emergence of China as an economic and military force, and
9/1 1-could well require Japan to take steps that, if it wishes to remain
true to a constitutional form of government, might involve far more than
just a reinterpretation of Article 9.40 Do the debates about these issues
38. "Japan's role has ... become increasingly vital to the maintenance of international
peace and security, which is precisely the mandate of the Security Council. We believe that
the role that Japan has played provides a solid basis for its assumption of permanent mem-
bership on the Security Council." Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister of Japan, Speech before
the United Nations General Assembly: A New United Nations for the New Era
(Sept. 27, 2004), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2004/09/
21addresse.html. Japan is the second largest contributor to the United Nations after the
United States. In 2002, it was assessed $218.4 million, 19.669 percent, of the UN regular
budget. The United States was assessed $283.1 million, 22 percent. Germany, the third larg-
est contributor, was assessed $109.3 million, 9.845 percent. United Nations, Chapter 5: Is
the United Nations Good Value for the Money?, in QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ... IMAGE &
REALITY... ABOUT THE UN (2003), available at http://www.un.org/geninfo/ir/.
39. Machimura: Revise Top Law for P-5 bid, DAILY YOMIURI, Sept. 30, 2004, at 3.
40. For a discussion of the developments in the 1990s that led to the formation of the
constitutional research commissions, see KENPO "KAISEI" NO S6TEN, supra note 17, at 21-
43. Watanabe speculates the Liberal Democratic Party's 1993 defeat after 38 years in power
and the Hosokawa administration's focus on political reform led naturally to talk of
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provide insight into larger questions, such as the role of a constitution,
not only in Japan, but in other modem societies as well? How does a
society like Japan reach agreement on contentious security and identity
issues, and what role does a constitution play in this decision-making
process?
Kim Scheppele describes a group of comparative constitutional
scholars who question the possibility of deriving broad models of con-
stitutionalism that will apply over a wide range of constitutional
systems. She writes:
The urgent issue in constitutional studies typically is to know
whether the experiences of some constitutional settings are
helpful for understanding others-and that will depend on how
similar other systems are to one's own, whether they have dealt
with the same sort of historical problems, whether they have
drawn their constitutional ideas from the same well.4'
These difficulties in deductive methodology have led recent scholars
to advocate what Scheppele describes as a more inductive, contextual
approach to constitutions, a kind of constitutional "ethnography." Such
ethnography, she writes, "does not ask about the big correlations be-
tween the specifics of constitutional design and the effectiveness of
specific institutions but instead looks to the logics of particular contexts
as a way of illuminating complex interrelationships among political,
legal, historical, social, economic, and cultural elements.,,4' The purpose
of examining such contexts is to identify "the mechanisms through
which governance is accomplished and the strategies through which
governance is attempted, experienced, resisted and revised, taken in his-
torical depth and cultural context.
' 43
constitutional change. Watanabe Osamu, Kyfjfi Nendai Kaikenron no Nerai to sono Tokuchd
[The Aims and Characteristics of the 90's Debate on Constitutional Change], in "KENP6
KAISEI" HIHAN ["Constitutional Revision": a Critical Look] 18, 18-20 (Watanabe Osamu et
al. eds., 1994).
41. Kim Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Ethnography: An Introduction, 38 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 389, 390 (2004).
42. Id. For work representative of this kind of approach, see e.g., Dae Kyu Yoon, The
Constitution of North Korea: Its Changes and Implications, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1289
(2004) (discussing the meaning of a constitution in a totalitarian system); GRAHAM HASSALL
& CHERYL SAUNDERS, ASIA-PACIFIC CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS (2002).
This contextual approach to comparative constitutionalism contrasts with a more for-
mal, deductive approach towards constitutional studies. A good discussion of these
approaches is found in Ruti Teitel, Comparative Constitutional Law in a Global Age, 117
HARv. L. REv. 2570 (2004) (book review). As will be seen in the foregoing discussion, this
Article attempts to draw elements from both approaches in examining the Japanese amend-
ment debates.
43. Scheppele, supra note 41, at 391.
[Vol. 27:55
Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan
Once scholars identify a society's repertoire of relationships,
mechanisms, and strategies, they can move to a more modest form of
theorizing by comparing the repertoire with those found in other sys-
tems. "In the end, what one has is not a universal one-size-fits-all theory
... but instead a set of repertoires that can be found in real cases and
that provide insight into how constitutional regimes operate." 44 For
Scheppele, the identification of such repertoires then enables us to both
"see more deeply into particular cases" and have "a sense of what to
expect in the future," although not in the sense of being able to predict
outcomes with certainty.45 "Constitutional ethnography has as its goal,
then, not prediction but comprehension, not explained variation but the-
matization .,46
Some constitutional scholarship has focused on how constitutions
provide heuristic devices, basic strategies that enable people to under-
stand and respond to their environment,47 that help a society reach
agreement and avoid making ill-considered decisions. In other words,
these heuristic devices represent a subset of Scheppele's mechanisms
and repertoires for governance. John Elster, building on the work of
Thomas Schelling, demonstrates one function of constitutions by exam-
ining human strategies to address the problems of passion, interest, and
48
time-inconsistency in decisionmaking. In his famous example, sailors
know in advance the Sirens are deadly, but cannot resist their song once
it is heard. Ulysses wants to hear the song, so he orders his men to tie
him to the mast and ignore his commands to release him until the
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. People use an "adaptive toolbox" to "provide strategies--cognitive, emotional,
and social-that help to handle a multitude of goals by making decisions quickly, frugally,
accurately, or, if possible, not at all." Gerd Gigerenzer, The Adaptive Toolbox, in BOUNDED
RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 37, 43 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten eds.,
2001) (citations omitted).
48. ELSTER, supra note 2, at 7-34 (citing THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF
CONFLICT (1960)). "Hyperbolic discounting" refers to an observed tendency in people to
apply high discount rates in choosing near-term payoffs and lower discount rates for payoffs
in the distant future. A person who has the choice of receiving $75 today or $100 next week
will choose $75, but when offered the choice of receiving $75 a year from now or $100 a
year and week from now will choose $100. Time-inconsistency arises because as the year
goes on the person will prefer the $75 payment. Hyperbolic discounting tends not to be ob-
served in more sophisticated settings such as stock markets. "Strategic time-inconsistency"
refers to empty threats, or situations in which an agent's statement (that he will act in some
way or that some result will occur if another agent acts in some way) lacks credibility. The
second agent will go ahead despite that statement because he knows the first agent will not
act as stated because it is not in his interest to do so. Id. 34-45. A parent at a supermarket
who warns his child that he will leave him behind if he does not hurry up is making an empty
threat.
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danger is past-he precommits himself to this strategy before he and his
crew draw within range of the Sirens.49
Similarly, "Constitutionalism ensures that constitutional change will
be slow, compared to the fast lane of ordinary parliamentary politics. 50
Specific provisions, such as amendment requirements and rules for
suspending the constitution, make constitutions resistant to change.52
Other features related to the machinery of political decisionmaking,
such as the separation of powers, a bicameral legislature, and the execu-
tive veto, can also have precommitment effects by abating the forces of
interest, passion and time-inconsistency. Requiring the agreement of
more than one branch of government demands more time and makes it
possible that the ill-considered decision of one branch will be counter-
balanced by better-thought-out decisions by the others. 53
Cass Sunstein contributes to this approach by arguing that a consti-
tution does more than prevent a society from making poor decisions. A
constitution helps society make hard decisions in the first place by mak-
ing precommitments about the way such decisions will be made. His
task is normative, an attempt to distinguish good constitutions from bad
ones in service of his ideal of deliberative democracy.54 "A deliberative
democracy, operating under a good constitution, responds to political
disagreements not simply by majority rule but also by attempting to cre-
ate institutions that will ensure reflection and reason-giving."" Sunstein
believes such deliberation can help resolve disputes by clarifying facts,
by delegating decisions to trusted persons, or by demonstrating certain
positions cannot be sustained. 5'
Sunstein is also concerned, however, that deliberation can heighten
political tensions, sometimes to the breaking point, as like-minded per-
49. JON ELSTER, ULYSSEES AND THE SIRENS 36-37 (rev. ed. 1984)
50. Id. at 100.
51. Id. at 101-04.
52. Id. at 104-05.
53. Elster is also known for identifying both "upstream" and "downstream" authorities
in the constitution-making process. The framers of constitutional precommitments are usu-
ally themselves constrained by upstream authorities, who convene constitutional assemblies
and select delegates to constitutional conventions. Id. at 105-06. Elster specifically cites the
Japanese Constitution as an example in which upstream authorities (the occupation forces)
imposed its constitution on the Japanese legislature that debated and approved the amend-
ments. Id. at 107. In other cases, such upstream authorities have greater or lesser degrees of
success in binding delegates to a constitutional convention. Id. at 108. At the other end of the
process are downstream authorities: the constituents who at some point will ratify the fin-
ished product. Elster argues sometimes delegates to constitutional assemblies will be
constrained by a ratification requirement to draft constitutions (or by extension, amendments
to constitutions) that are likely to be accepted by their constituencies. Id. at 113-15.
54. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 97 & 251-52 n.4.
55. Id. at 239.
56. Id.
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sons tend to group together and form extreme views.57 The potentially
destructive intra-group radicalization of churches, political parties, trade
groups, unions, and interest groups results in part from social influences
on behavior. An individual will often take a position because it agrees
with that of others in the same group even though there is no guarantee
that the group is right. This is partly because it is often costly to acquire
information to form one's own judgment and partly because an individ-
ual will often choose a position to preserve her reputation with other
group members." The effect of these two forces can be amplified by an
information cascade, the rapid spread of ideas or behaviors once a criti-
cal mass of adherents has been reached. 59
These social influences combine with another feature of groups that
contributes to social polarization. A group with a finite number of mem-
bers has a finite pool of arguments its members can use to justify a
group's position. Drawing from the results of psychological group ex-
periments, Sunstein argues that a group with a limited pool of arguments
has a tendency to adopt the most persuasive argument available. This
often leads a group to take the most extreme version of the position un-
der consideration.
An effective constitution can dampen the polarizing effects of these
dynamics in two ways. First, it can increase "the likelihood that gov-
ernment power will be unavailable to those who have not spoken with
those having competing views." 6 Therefore, deliberative groups are not
necessarily permanently entrenched. In some cases, a deliberative group
polarized on a particular position will depolarize when put into contact
with another group:
A democratic constitution ... increases the likelihood that
members of the relevant groups are not isolated from conversa-
tion with people having quite different views. The goal of that
conversation is to promote the interests of those inside and
57. Id. at 15-42, 239-40.
58. For example, a church member may privately have doubts about intelligent design
but will still criticize evolutionary theory because she wants to be viewed by her fellow
church members as faithful.
59. An information cascade occurs when an individual, faced with the choice between
A and B, chooses A because everyone else is doing so (as it were, a public signal of what to
do), even though the individual's private signal tells him to choose B. Thus it is possible for
mistaken judgments to spread rapidly through a population. But, under this theory, such
cascades are so volatile they are easy to reverse through the infusion of additional informa-
tion. For a discussion of the phenomenon, see Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd
Behavior, 107 Q. J. EcorN. 797 (1992); Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch,
A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J.
POL. EcON. 992 (1992).
60. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 240.
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outside the relevant enclaves, by subjecting group members to
competing positions, by allowing them to exchange views with
others and to see things from their point of view, and by ensur-
ing that the wider society does not marginalize, and thus
insulate itself from, views that may turn out to be right or at
least informative. ' '6!
Second, constitutional decisionmaking involves not just a set of pro-
cedures, but also concepts ranging from the very abstract, such as
equality, happiness, or security, to the very concrete, such as allowing a
copy of the Ten Commandments to stand on the capitol grounds. Such
concepts and their different levels of abstraction allow deliberative
groups to reach what Sunstein terms "incompletely theorized agree-
ments." These are theoretical compromises that allow persons with
different points of view to reach agreement on one level of abstraction
while not reaching agreement on other levels.6 The deliberative groups
making up a society may never agree on the issue of gay marriage, for
example, but there can be widespread consensus on the idea of equality.
Or, people can agree on the assessment of a particular tax but have dif-
61ferent and perhaps irreconcilable reasons for their support.
61. Id. at 41. Such contact between deliberative groups does not guarantee depolariza-
tion and with it, the likelihood of consensus, but may in fact lead to it. Contact with another
group may serve as an external shock that disturbs the equilibrium reached within a group.
Id. at 30-31. Such contact also increases the pool of arguments for or against a particular
policy. Id. at 44.
62. Id. at 50.
63. One can have an incompletely theorized agreement on a general principle without
agreement on what the principle entails, or one can have incompletely theorized agreements
about particular outcomes, with agreement on low-level reasons that account for them. Id. at
56-57. In between, people can agree on a mid-level reason for action, but disagree about
both supporting higher level reasons and particular outcomes. Id. For this latter point, Sun-
stein uses the example that people might agree government should not discriminate on the
basis of race, yet have conflicting views on a more general concept of equality and on
whether a non-discrimination principle supports affirmative action. Id. Sunstein is aware that
Elster has recently expressed doubt whether the framers of a constitution would choose to
limit themselves in this way. Id. at 251-52 n.4. Sunstein avoids this problem by arguing that
his analysis is normative, not descriptive of how a constitution might emerge. Id. Elster's
primary concerns relate to the extent to which collective decisionmaking is like individual
decisionmaking. ELSTER, supra note 2, at 92. He acknowledges that constitutions often bind
others and are not acts of self-binding. Id. at 92-94. Furthermore, he observes that constitu-
tions are not binding in the strict sense, in so far as constitutions do not make it impossible
for a society to engage in a particular behavior; they only make it difficult to do so. Id. at 94-
96. Elster concludes, however, that constitutional precommitment is not meaningless because
constitutions can be self-binding, particularly when the framers of a constitution make up the
first legislature. Id. at 94. He also notes that future generations might have the same reasons
for self-binding as do the original framers. Id. Finally, he points out that not all individual
precommitment strategies make future behaviors impossible. Id. Elster's point (that future
generations might have the same reasons for self-binding as do the framers) reflects a more
general idea discussed by Elster and reflects the fact that constitutions, as well as their inter-
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The procedural and conceptual heuristics provided in constitutions
to enable consensus are a subset of all human cultural tools, and as such
they share both the capacities and limitations common to these tools.
J.M. Balkin argues human understanding and human institutions are
made possible through conceptual tools he refers to as "cultural soft-
ware." Such tools are "the abilities, associations, heuristics, metaphors,
narratives, and capacities that we employ in understanding and evaluat-
ing the social world." 64 In Balkin's view, a deeper understanding of how
these conceptual tools operate, are transmitted, and evolve helps explain
how "cultural understandings can be shared while still accounting for
the considerable differentiation and disagreement in belief among mem-
bers of the same culture or interpretive community."
65
One of the most important themes that emerge from Balkin's work
is that all cultural tools, be they tools of understanding, technology, or
social institutions, are subject to "bricolage," a term Balkin borrows
from Claude Levi-Strauss. 6 Cultural tools are subject to bricolage in
that they are themselves the cumulative result of earlier tools. "The his-
tory of thought is the history of the cumulative marshaling of existing
capacities to form new ones, the use of older cultural software to create
new 'idea-programs.' ,,67 Balkin argues this has four implications: "Cul-
tural bricolage (1) is cumulative, (2) involves unintended uses, (3) is
economical or recursive, and (4) has unintended consequences., 6s The
cumulative nature of cultural tools implies "[t]he tools ... one can cre-
ate at a particular time depend largely on the available materials that lie
to hand." Further, "[t]he complexity and performance of a tool are nec-
essarily limited by the nature of the tools available to construct it."'69 For
example, a space program is made possible, and at the same time lim-
ited, by the technologies and institutions that preexist it. Similarly,
pretation and implementation, are product of bricolage, a concept I discuss in the next sec-
tion. Elster distinguishes between essential constraints, that are created or chosen precisely
because of their precommitment functions, and incidental constraints, those that may not
have been chosen by an individual for their constraining effects, but that nevertheless have
such effects. Id. at 4. Thus, in one sense, it does not matter whether the framers of a constitu-
tion choose to bind themselves on purpose; what matters is whether any features of a
constitution have constraining effects and whether those effects provide some benefit to the
society in question.
64. BALKIN, supra note 3, at 6.
65. Id. at 7.
66. As Balkin discusses, Levi-Strauss argued that "human thought operates like the
bricoleur, or odd-job person, who fixes a leak or other problem with whatever tools lie to
hand." Id. at 31 (citing CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 16-36 (1966)).
67. Id. Mark Tushnet also uses the concept of bricolage in comparative constitutional
studies in Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.
J. 1225, 1285-1301 (1999).
68. BALKIN, supra note 3, at 32.
69. Id.
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financial institutions, such as a mutual fund, are made possible by a
number of interrelated institutions and practices.
Cultural bricolage also means tools can be put to uses for which
they were not originally intended. Institutions reflect the multifunctional
nature of these tools.' Balkin writes, "[H]uman institutions solve prob-
lems of organization, reproduction, and stabilization by adopting and
adapting features of other social structures that their members are famil-
iar with. In this way new forms of human sociability are constructed out
of older ones.72 Kinship is a good example of this kind of institutional
tool; it is an obvious means by which a society organizes itself, and ex-
tensions of the concept have been used by many cultures to encourage
cooperation beyond blood relatives.73
By "economical and recursive," Balkin means a relatively small set
of tools can be used in a large number of ways, thereby creating new
conceptual or institutional tools that in turn are applied to older tools.
Balkin uses gender to illustrate this point: gender is not only used to
distinguish between male and female, but also to stereotype, and in ref-
erence to a variety of objects like ships and hurricanes. In addition,
gender can be used simply for conceptual purposes. For instance, many
languages divide nouns into gender categories that have nothing to do
with biological gender. The use of gender in these other ways, however,
can affect the way male and female are understood.74 This point can be
applied to deliberation as well. Constitutionally enhanced deliberation
can be used to avoid ill-considered decisions, as understood by Elster,
but it can also be used to achieve consensus, as envisioned by Sunstein.
Deliberation might involve trying to use the deliberative process itself to
achieve consensus through the sharing of ideas and arguments, or it
might be used to help deliberative groups realize a consensus had al-
ready emerged before deliberation began. The extent to which such
deliberation helps a society achieve or recognize agreement will in turn
impact how a society values its constitution.
Finally, according to Balkin, "[t]he bricoleur's economical and cu-
mulative use of tools in unintended ways can and often does lead to
unexpected and unintended consequences both for good and for ill.
75
70. Id.
71. Id. at 32-33.
72. Id. at 33.
73. To illustrate from the Japanese experience, fictive kinships were used by lords in
feudal Japan to strengthen relationships with their vassals. JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY
WITHOUT POWER 37-38 (1991); John Whitney Hall, Feudalism in Japan-A Reassessment,
in STUDIES IN THE INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF EARLY MODERN JAPAN 15, 50 (John W. Hall
& Marius B. Jansen eds., 1968) (discussing kinship terms).
74. BALKIN, supra note 3, at 34.
75. Id.
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Tools are transmitted and evolve over time; this is a fact that dovetails
with Sunstein's discussion of how positions are taken and transmitted
within groups." As with any product of an evolutionary process, a social
tool results from historical developments that foreclose certain avenues
of development and open up other possibilities. As a result, social tools
posses two crucial attributes. First, the path-dependent nature of such
tools reiterates the need, as Scheppele advocates, to look closely at how
the social mechanisms and concepts used for governance work within a
particular context. Second, as Balkin puts it,
[c]ultural tools produced by bricolage never work perfectly:
when they do work it is usually only well enough for the pur-
pose at hand .... There is never a time when the products of
cultural bricolage lack a certain jerry-built character, when they
do not have unexpected side effects or the potential for such
side effects. The history of the development of culture is always
the history of muddling through.... ."
76. Balkin relies on the memetic transmission of cultural information, introduced by
Richard Dawkins and developed by scholars such as Susan Blackmore and Robert Aunger,
See RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE (1989 ed.); SUSAN BLACKMORE, THE MEME
MACHINE (1999); DARWINIZING CULTURE (Robert Aunger ed., 2000); ROBERT AUNGER, THE
ELECTRIC MEME (2002). Memes, to use Balkin's language, are pieces of cultural software, or
as Dawkins describes them, replicators, that are the basic units of cultural information.
DAWKINS, supra, at 192. These pieces of cultural software are subject to high levels of vari-
ability and become units of selection, and the "environment" in which such memes
"compete" is the human mind and the various media, such as books and sound recordings,
that preserve memes outside of the body. Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson focus instead
on cultural mechanisms that transfer and transform the cultural information that affects be-
havior. ROBERT BOYD & PETER J. RICHERSON, CULTURE & THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS
(1985). They identify three such mechanisms, direct bias, frequency dependent bias, and
indirect bias. These can be roughly understood as rules of thumb for "choosing" among pos-
sible cultural traits in a given social environment. Id. at 134-35. With direct bias, the
physical environment itself determines what trait will be selected by rendering one cultural
variant "more attractive than others. Id. at 135. For example, if people live in an area where
there is ready access to wood, but little access to stone, this will impact what kinds of houses
they will build. With direct bias, there will tend to be little variation when cultural norms are
transmitted. With frequency dependent bias, a person chooses a behavior in which the most
people, or conversely, in which the least people engage. Id. at 135, 204-40. With indirect
bias, people choose a behavior based on some other trait that people who already have en-
gaged in that behavior possess-a person wears a particular athletic shoe because a
successful athlete does too. Id. at 135.
77. BALKIN, supra note 3, at 39. The idea that evolving cultural tools work only well
enough for the purpose at hand is made by Jody Kraus in her discussion of the transmission
of business norms. Jody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Cultural Norms, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 377 (1997). Gigerenzer also writes, "The notion of an adaptive toolbox full of
specialized devices .... invokes the more modest abilities of a 'backwoods mechanic and
used part dealer[.]'" Gigerenzer, supra note 47, at 43.
Fall 20051
Michigan Journal of International Law
One would then expect that the precommitment strategies and con-
cepts provided in constitutions, as well as the decisions emerging from
them, will present unexpected results.
IV. DELIBERATION AND BRICOLAGE IN THE PROCESS
AND SUBSTANCE OF THE AMENDMENT DEBATES
The scholarship on constitutions as providing heuristics for consent
fits well with Japanese understandings of law. John Haley has shown
how allocations of power in Japan, dating as far back as the first con-
solidations of villages and continuing through feudal and modem times,
are marked by the separation of the authority to promulgate rules and
norms from the power to enforce them. Law in traditional Japan was
restricted to administrative and adjudicative practices that applied to the
ruling class and its vassals. Other, less formal modes of social control
were used in the Japanese villages, where the large majority of the
population lived. Unlike in the West and China, in Japan, no uniform
moral theory served as an ultimate legitimizing force for power. As a
result, "[legitimacy in Japan derives above all else from consent and
consensus, as reflected in history as a shared, present perception of the
past and custom. 7 Haley explains that "formal law making law-
enforcing processes-whether legislative, bureaucratic, or judicial-
functions in large measure as consensus-building processes .... Sub-
stantive legal norms, as the product of such consensus, enjoy legitimacy
and "thus operate as principles-tatemae-that both shape and reflect
consensus. Without effective formal enforcement, they can only par-
tially bind or command. They do not fully control or determine conduct
but they do influence and restrain."'
The emphasis on consensus is an outgrowth of Japan's highly com-
munitarian society, based on a complex web of reciprocal relationships.
This is not a community, however, in which everyone is equal or where
everyone is included. Haley writes:
Even within the community not all necessarily participate. To
have a voice, one must sit at the table. Conflicts over political
78. HALEY, supra note 73, at 195.
79. Id. at 198.
80. Id. at 199. Peter Katzenstein takes this view of Article 9. KATZENSTEIN, supra note
12, at 47. He also cites with approval the work of Tom Rohlen, who also observes "Japan is
marked by a coincidence of strict, vertical systems and high degrees of lower-level auton-
omy." Id. at 32 (citations omitted). For a more detailed discussion of the Japanese legislative
process, see Mutsuo Nakamura & Teruki Tsunemoto, The Legislative Process: Outline and
Actors, in FIVE DECADES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 4, at 195.
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influence in Japan are less about who has the authority to make a
decision or who wins the majority to their side than simply having
a seat. And as within all hierarchical social structures, the opin-
ions and preferences of some matter more than those of others.
Equality of legal status does not mean equality of influence. But
that too can to some degree be a matter of consensus."
The debates on Article 9 provide a good opportunity to observe how
law functions in the Japanese context. Segments of Japanese society are
now trying to determine whether there is "a shared, present perception" of
important aspects of its identity: its past militarism, its experiment with
democracy, and in particular, its present security needs, its experience with
Article 9, and how much of the past Japan can take into the future.
A. Deliberative Groups
Various groups have taken different stances towards Article 9, and
attempts to amend it began soon after the first moves to rearm in the
1950s. Thomas Berger identifies three major political subcultures in Ja-
pan during the postwar period: right-idealist, centrist, and left-idealist.1
2
Right-idealists had a strong reverence for Japanese tradition and values.
Although they appreciated the enormity of the Japanese defeat, they op-
posed occupation reforms they believed were meant to weaken Japan,
including Article 9. As international realists, however, they supported a
strong alliance with the United States. They also believed in a strong
military and advocated the repeal of Article 9, as well as the removal of
other restraints on the military. At the same time, they supported civilian
control over the armed forces.83
Centrists were equally critical of the Japanese pre-war establishment
and found their models for a new Japan in capitalism and the United
States. There were three main pillars to their defense policy. The first
was the perception that Japan was incapable of defending itself alone, a
view, as I discussed earlier, that is still widely shared.84 Second was the
belief that Japan should focus first on economic development. Third,
centrists feared the reemergence of the military and the threat it might
pose to democracy. 85 The outcome was almost total dependence on the
United States for security, resulting in deference to the United States in
security matters and in East Asian diplomacy, permission for the United
81. JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW 17 (1998).
82. THOMAS U. BERGER, CULTURES OF ANTIMILITARISM: NATIONAL SECURITY IN
GERMANY AND JAPAN 56(1998).
83. Id. at 56-57.
84. See supra text accompanying note 21.
85. BERGER, supra note 82, at 63.
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States to maintain bases in Japan, and Japan's maintenance of a force of
its own. 6 The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), formed in 1955, was a
coalition of centrists and right-idealists. Most business leaders shared
centrist views and supported ties with the West, although opinion was
split over rearmament, with strong proponents and detractors."
Left-idealists wanted a complete break with Japan's past, which
they saw as responsible for Japan's destruction. This group had a strong
pan-Asian identity. Although they were not Stalinists, they viewed the
Soviet Union and China as friendly and were strongly opposed to Ja-
pan's security relationship with the United States. Their pacifist ideals,
which they believed were both embodied and implemented in the Con-
stitution, were drawn from General Douglas MacArthur and then-Prime
Minister Shidehara Kijuro. 8 Left-idealists were supported by the main-
stream of the intelligentsia and by the public service segment of the
organized labor movement." On the political level, left-idealists found
representation for their views in the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) and
the more radical Japanese Communist Party (JCP).
As Berger notes, these subcultures, the groups that represented them,
and the rough accommodations they reached in the 1950s and early 1960s
set the pattern for Japan's approach to security that became more firmly
embedded in the ensuing decades. There has, however, been a slow shift to
the center. Throughout the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, support
for a minimal self-defense force rose, but a strong preference for non-
military means for defense continued.90 Centrist scholars and media began
to obtain a broader hearing.9' During the 1980s, growing economic power
and increasing trade tensions with the United States caused the right-
idealists, who had previously strongly supported the United States, to em-
phasize economic over military power.92 From the 1960s to the 1980s, left-
idealists continued to oppose militarism. The Japan Socialist Party saw
some gains in the 1960s and 1970s and continued to oppose militarism
and the U.S. alliance. Berger argues, however, that "[i]ncreasingly the
public began to view the JSP as mired in anachronistic thinking .... "9'
The JSP eventually moderated its defense policy when it joined the coali-
tion that wrested power from the LDP in 1993. It made further changes
when it joined with the LDP during the mid 1990s. 94 Also, in 1991, the
86. Id.
87. Id. at 76.
88. Id. at 59-60.
89. Id. at 73, 75-76.
90. Id. at 112-14.
91. Id. at 116-17.
92. Id. at 146-47.
93. Id. at 120-22, 163.
94. Id. at 184-85.
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party changed its name to the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ).95
Berger writes that immediately after the JSP came to power in the 1990s,
it appeared as if it would completely moderate its left-idealist stance.
However, this appearance was short-lived, as members of the SDPJ soon
objected strongly to the recommendation by leaders at the Japan Defense
Agency to amend Article 9.96
The result is that despite movement to the center, the current debates
continue to reflect the three political cultures and their views on de-
fense. At the same time, the relative waning in influence of the left-
idealist viewpoint, at least among the political parties, shows the close
relationship between policy positions and the groups that bear them.
Sunstein and Balkin's work indicates that while ideas may persist be-
cause of their merits, they also endure because of who bears them and
how successful these groups are in sustaining themselves over time.97
The JSP won a majority for the first and only time in 1947 and took part
in coalition governments in the Katayama and Ashida cabinets, although
it was not able to widen its base of support while in office.9 Internal
disputes, opposition from the United States, competition from the Japa-
nese Communist Party and left-leaning splinter groups, the consolidation
of power in the LDP from 1955-1993, and the gradual discrediting of the
JSP's economic policies, especially as Japan's economy mushroomed,
all combined to prevent the JSP from becoming a dominant force in
Japanese politics. 99 Richard Mason and John Caiger argue that the So-
cialists have aligned more with the LDP on foreign policy issues, largely
because of the durability of the U.S.-Japan alliance, trade problems with
the United States, growing economic power, and world conditions) °°
The passage of time may have revealed the positions initially taken by
the JSP as untenable on their merits, but the relationship between
95. RICHARD SIMS: JAPANESE POLITICAL HISTORY SINCE THE MEIJI RENOVATION:
1868-2000, at 335. (2001). In 1996, a significant number of more conservative members of
the SDPJ left to join the newly forming Minshuto, or Democratic Party. Id. at 349.
96. BERGER, supra note 82, at 185.
97. Balkin makes this point in connection with scientific information. In his view,
scientific truths can be compelling, but often the audience must be trained to perceive the
value of such truths. "[E]ven the most indubitable of truths may require elaborate institutions
of education ... if they are to be preserved and propagated." BALKIN, supra note 3, at 86.
Without such institutions, "the true beliefs that they propagate may become extinct as well."
Id.
98. See SIMS, supra note 95, at 255-58.
99. See id. at 261, 264, 283-84, 308, 313, 335-37, 348-49 (discussing developments
in the history of the JSP). According to Sims, the JSP's decision to lead a coalition govern-
ment required it to make compromises that alienated its supporters and exacerbated internal
divisions. Id. at 257. Moreover, the JSP's rise to power coincided with a shift in U.S. Occu-
pation policy from social reform (several aspects of which were championed by the JSP) to
economic development. Id. at 258.
100. R.H.P. MASON & J.G. CAIGER, A HISTORY OF JAPAN 369 (rev. ed. 1997).
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deliberative groups and the positions they take is a complex one in
which each affects the other.
Because of the important role they play in the amendment process, I
pay particular attention to the political subcultures as they are manifested
in the political parties.'0 ' (However, it is important to note that national se-
curity issues and Article 9 are being debated by the government bureaucracy,
media, academics, business associations, and other interest groups, many of
which can trace their origins to the immediate postwar period, if not even
earlier.'0 z) Japan's parties are famous for their factionalism. Berger writes,
"Factional struggles in Japan are fierce, merciless, and relentless." '13 By
101. For a recent discussion of Japanese postwar politics, see SIMs, supra note 95.
102. For a discussion of the groups influential in the formation of Japanese foreign
policy, see GREEN, supra note 21, at 47-69. A thorough examination of the process of socie-
tal consensus building would examine the role that other deliberative groups, including non-
governmental organizations, play in the larger Japanese society; however, it is not within the
scope of this paper to do so. For recent discussions of such groups in Japan, see the collec-
tion of essays in THE STATE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN JAPAN (Frank J. Schwartz & Susan J. Pharr
eds., 2003). As Veronica Taylor observes, the views of policy makers and other aspects of the
revision debates are broadly accessible to such groups, as well as the Japanese public. De-
velopments in the debates are widely reported in the press, a voluminous amount of material
produced by the constitutional research commissions is available on the Internet as part of
recent government policy promoting transparency in decisionmaking, and several groups on
different sides of the debates have disseminated their views online. Interview with Veronica
Taylor, Director, Asian Law Center, University of Washington, in Seattle, Wash. (Aug. 10,
2005). The net effect is that it is possible for interested groups and members of the public to
familiarize themselves with the various sides of the debate and the positions of others. In this
sense, it is possible, in my view, to speak of a national conversation on constitutional revi-
sion. This conclusion, however, is tentative. Laurie Freeman argues although the Internet
creates the potential in Japan for greater involvement by non-governmental organizations in
policy-making, these developments are recent and are preceded by what Freeman views is
the relative homogenization of the Japanese media. Laurie Freeman, Mobilizing and Demobi-
lizing the Japanese Public Sphere: Mass Media and the Internet in Japan, in THE STATE OF
CIVIL SOCIETY IN JAPAN 235 (2003).
103. BERGER, supra note 82, at 81. For further discussion of factions in Japanese poli-
tics, see TAKETSUGU TSURUTANI, POLITICAL CHANGE IN JAPAN (1977). Tsurutani attributes
factionalism within the LDP to traditional reciprocal relationships between older superiors
(oyabun) and younger subordinates (kobun) that exist throughout Japanese society, and the
fact the LDP originated in the 1950s from an amalgamation of several different parties, each
with their own sets of relationships and loyalties. Id. at 97-105. Attempts were made in the
1990s to reform factionalism within the LDP, but factions continue out of recognition of their
usefulness in selecting the party president and the role they play in bringing some cohesion
within such a large party. See Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, The Organization of the
LDP: LDP Policy Groups (Factions), at http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/english/overview/lO.html.
(last visited Sept. 29, 2005)(recognizing eight 'policy groups' or factions) See also J. MARK
RAMSEYER & FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN'S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 59-79
(1993) (discussing the positive uses of factionalism in the LDP). Mason and Caiger argue
that "personal and intergenerational feuds" were responsible for the LDP loss of power in
1993. MASON & CAIGER, supra note 100, at 371. Mason & Caiger note that factionalism has
historical roots. It was present in party politics after the establishment of the Meiji Constitu-
tion and into the Taisho era. Id. at 292, 330. See also GORDON MARK BERGER, PARTIES OUT
OF POWER IN JAPAN, 1931-41 16 (1977) (discussing the oyabun/kobun structure of the po-
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necessity, faction leaders are forced to enter into temporary alliances with
other factions to implement their policies. "Such alliances, however, are
marriages of convenience, lasting for relatively short periods before the
leaders' mutually exclusive desires for power lead them to seek new al-
lies."'04 This makes it difficult for any one political leader to bring about
sweeping change within even her own party, let alone among others.'
5
Recall Sunstein's concern that intra-group dynamics tend to cause polari-
zation in deliberative groups.'°6 One could well understand how the need
for younger faction members to adopt and support the views of their lead-
ers and to signal loyalty could lead to polarization. Party factionalism
within the major Japanese parties indicates deliberative groups are often
loose associations of smaller, more cohesive deliberative groups. This
raises a question about the ability of such groups to reach consensus. Con-
tact with other deliberative groups may help groups put themselves in the
shoes of others and expose them to a wider pool of arguments. If delibera-
tive groups are highly factionalized, however, it is possible such contact
will not lead to "better" decisionmaking, as attempts to accommodate the
views of another deliberative group could disrupt the equilibrium within
one's own group. Further, once a party has taken a particular position re-
garding defense, fleeting political power may make it difficult to change.
The Diet is controlled by a coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party
and the New Komeito. The recent House of Representatives elections
greatly strengthened this coalition. As of September 21, 2005, the
LDP held 295 of 480 seats in the House of Representatives'07 and 113
of 242 seats in the House of Councillors.' ° The LDP issued a new draft
constitution in late October.' 9 Consistent with LDP recommendations
from the party's inception,"" the LDP draft retains the paragraph 1 war
litical parties during the Taish6 and early Sh6wa periods); PETER Duus, PARTY RIVALRY AND
POLITICAL CHANGE IN TAIsH6 JAPAN 169-72 (1968) (discussing internal divisions within the
political party, Seiyukai, during the 1920s).
104. BERGER, supra note 82, at 81-82.
105. See, e.g., MIKisO HANE, MODERN JAPAN: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 392 (3d ed. 2001)
("Intraparty factionalism kept the LDP from becoming a steamrolling power machine.").
106. See infra text accompanying notes 57-63.
107. House of Representatives, Strength of Political Groups in the House of Represen-
tatives (Nov. 29, 2005), at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/index.nsf/html/index-e-strength.htm. In
addition to the seats held by parties, there are three independent and two vacant seats.
108. House of Councillors, Strength of the Political Groups in the House of Councillors
(Oct. 25, 2005), at http://www.sangiin.go.jp/eng/member/f d_3.htm. In addition to the seats
held by parties, there are five independent seats.
109. Jiyihnint6, Shinkenp6 s6an [New Draft Constitution], Oct. 28, 2005, at
www.jimin.jp/jimin/shinkenpou/shiryou/pdf/051028_a.pdf [hereinafter LDP Draft].
110. Jiyflminshuto Kenpo Chosakai [Liberal Democratic Party Constitutional Research
Commission], Kenp6 Kaisei no Mondaiten [Issues for Constitutional Revision] (Apr. 28,
1956), reprinted in KENP6 "KAISEI" NO STEN, supra note 17, at 535, 537-38 (arguing that
while the fundamental spirit of the renunciation of war in paragraph 1 should be maintained,
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renunciation clause but confirms the right to engage in self-defense. The
draft makes several changes to paragraph 2. First, it clarifies that Japan
has the right to maintain a self-defense "military force" (jiegun)"' under
the authority of the prime minister for the purpose of preserving Japa-
nese peace and independence and the safety of the state and its
citizens."2 The amendment would thus make expressly constitutional the
right of Japan to use force for self-defense and maintain a military to
exercise such force. Second, the military force would, pursuant to stat-
ute, be permitted to participate in international activities to preserve
international peace and security."3 This change would obviously confirm
Japan's ability to engage in UN peacekeeping operations. The draft does
not directly address collective self-defense, but the broad amending lan-
guage could be interpreted as allowing the SDF to engage in such
activity to the extent it can be construed as part of international coopera-
tive measures to preserve international peace and security. Finally, the
new military force would be permitted by statute to promote public or-
der and protect the lives or freedom of the people.' 14 These amendments
thus attempt to resolve the three major constitutional issues raised by
Article 9 (concerning the SDF, the Japan-U.S. security agreement, and
UN peacekeeping) by codifying the status quo and taking into account
recent legislative expansions of the SDF's emergency powers. Major
business organizations"' and the influential Yomiuri Newspaper group
share these substantive positions on national security."6
paragraph 2 should be amended to confirm the constitutionality of a defense force bound by
the principle of minimum necessary force).
111. This is opposed to the present self-defense force (jietai).
112. LDP Draft, supra note 109, art. 9, para. 2, clause 1.
113. Id. art. 9, para.2, clause 3.
114. Id. art. 9, para.2, clause 3. As discussed earlier, the Diet has already passed legisla-
tion enabling the SDF to act in emergencies. See supra note 28.
115. See, e.g., Keidanren, the Japan Association of Corporate Executives, and the Kan-
sai Association of Corporate Executives. Nippon Keidanren, Looking to Japan's Future:
Keidanren's Perspective on Constitutional Issues (Jan. 18, 2005), at http://www.
keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/2005/002.html [hereinafter Keidanren Position Paper] (a trans-
lation of a longer Japanese paper, Nippon Keizai Dantai Rengokaiai [Keidanren], Waga Kuni
no Kihonmondai o Kangaeru [Considering Our Country's Fundamental Issues], at
http://www.keidanren.or.jp/japanese/policy/2005/002/honbun.html#part4); Keizai D6yfikai
[Japan Association of Corporate Executives], Atarashii Heiwa Kokka o Mezashite [Aiming
for a New Nation of Peace] (July 1994), in KENP6 "KAIsEI" NO SOTEN, supra note 17, at 145,
156; Kansai Keizai D6yukai Anzenhosh6 Iinkai [Kansai Association of Corporate Executives
Security Committee], Teigen Shinrai sareru Nihon_[Proposal: A Japan that is Trusted] (Mar.
1994), in KENP6 "KAIsEI" NO S6TEN, supra note 17, at 116, 131-32; Kansai Keizai D6yiikai
Kihonmondai Bukai [Kansai Association of Corporate Executives Basic Issues Section Meet-
ing], Nihonkoku Kenp5 o Kangaeru [Considering the Constitution of Japan] (Apr. 1994).
116. The Yomiuri Newspaper group has published a series of proposed revisions to the
Constitution, beginning in 1994 and extending most recently to 2004. KENP6 KAiSEi: YOMI-
URI SHIAN 2004NEN [Constitutional Revision: Yomiuri Draft 2004] 327 (Yomiuri Shinbun
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The New Komeito," 17 the LDP's current coalition partner, holds 31
seats in the House of Representatives " ' and 24 seats in the House of
Councillors.119 In a policy statement issued in 1999,120 the party argued
that the renunciation of war in Article 9 must remain the cornerstone of
Japanese foreign policy and national security. It supports a strengthened
U.S.-Japan security relationship, but it believes collective self-defense is
unconstitutional and rejects changing the government's interpretation
against collective self-defense. The New Komeito did, however, support
legislation that allowed for consolidated response to national threats,
including terrorism. It also supports Japanese participation in UN
peacekeeping operations and helped in the passage of the Peacekeeping
Operations Law. 121
Minshiit6, or the Democratic Party of Japan, holds 112 seats in the
House of Representatives 12 and 82 seats in the House of Councillors.
121
In a provisional position paper released in 1999,114 Minshiit6, in advance
of the establishment of the constitutional research commissions, ex-
pressed support for a wide ranging examination of the Constitution and
security issues. It accepts what it views to be a consensus among the
Japanese people that neither the use of force for self-defense nor the
SDF are unconstitutional, 12 and it accepts the concept of minimum nec-
essary force. 12 It thus reflects centrist views on defense. Minshiit6 also
supports Japanese participation in UN peacekeeping operations, but it
opposes engagement when the use of force is involved or when the
armed forces of individual countries act under Security Council
ed., 2004) (2000 and 2004 proposed drafts) [hereinafter YOMIURI SHIAN 2004NEN]; Yomiuri
Shinbun, A Proposal for the Revision of the Text of the Constitution of Japan, reprinted in
HOOK & MCCORMACK, supra note 12, at 55 (1994 proposed draft).
117. The New Komeito and its predecessor, Komeito, emerged from Soka Gakkai, a
Buddhist religious movement that gained popularity in the 1950s and 60s. TSURUTANI, supra
note 103, at 151-53.
118. House of Representatives, supra note 107.
119. House of Councillors, supra note 108.
120. New Komeito, Key Policy Initiatives (Nov. 4, 2002), available at
http://www.komei.or.jp/en/policy/index.html.
121. Id. ch. 5.2.1. New Komeito appears to leave at least some room for collective self-
defense within the Japanese homeland. It argues collective self-defense is "an unacceptable
option in any military contingency beyond the borders of Japan." Id.
122. House of Representatives, supra note 107. The number also includes the so-called
Club of Independents. Minshfto was formed in 1998 with the combination of four parties: a
former Democratic Party of Japan, the Good Governance Party, the New Fraternity Party and
the Democratic Party. In 2001, it merged with the Liberal Party, headed by Ichiro Ozawa.
123. House of Councillors, supra note 108.
124. DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN, THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN'S BASIC POLI-
CIES ON SECURITY (Provisional Version) (June 1999) available at http://www.dpj.or.jp/
english/policy/security.html.
125. Id. § 11(2).
126. Id. § 11(6)3.
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resolutions. 127 The party supports the U.S.-Japan security agreement, but
its policy has been to oppose collective self-defense 12 and it considers
this issue irresolvable by a change in the government's interpretation of
Article 9.129 In a more recent foreign policy statement by Minshiita's
former president, Okada Katsuya, the party supports furthering coopera-
tion with the United States in peacemaking and nationbuilding in the
Asia-Pacific Region, but it calls for SDF deployments to be made under
the United Nations framework in other regions, including the Middle
East and Africa." A proposed draft set of revisions to the Constitution
is expected in early 2006.
The JCP has nine seats in both the House of Representatives and the
House of Councillors.' The party has consistently opposed Japanese
rearmament and calls for what it terms the complete implementation of
Article 9, including the abrogation of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and
the dismantling of the SDE1 2 It has been active in organizing public
opposition to changes to Article 9 by sponsoring public events opposing
amendments and locally organized Article 9 clubs.
The SDPJ, as discussed earlier, is a remnant of the JSP. It has seven
seats in the House of Representatives and six seats in the House of
Councillors.'33 The SDPJ opposes any changes to or reinterpretations of
Article 9 that would give the SDF constitutional status or would allow
the SDF to be deployed abroad, even under UN auspices.
114
It is important to note that the public has largely resisted amend-
ments throughout most of the history of Article 9. Popular opinion in
Japan continues to oppose militarism; however, polls have shown recent
changes. According to a survey conducted by the Asahi Shinbun (a ma-
jor Japanese newspaper) in 2001, most Japanese were in favor of
revisions to the Constitution, but over 70 percent opposed amendments
127. Id. § 11(4).
128. Id. § 11(6)4.
129. Id. § 11(5).
130. Okada Katsuya, 'Hirakareta Kokueki' o Mezashite: Ajia soshite Sekai to tomo ni
Ikiru [Aim at an Open National Interest: To Live Together with Asia and then the World] at
11-12 (May 18, 2005), available at http://www.dpj.or.jp/vision/honbun.pdf. Although Min-
shfit6 supports continuing relations with the United States, it argues Japan should not support
post September 11 th U.S. unilateralism and preemptive strikes. Id. at 11-12.
131. House of Representatives, supra note 107; House of Councillors, supra note 108.
132. JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY, PROGRAM OF THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY art.
12 (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.jcp.or.jp/english/23rd-congress/program.html.
133. House of Representatives, supra note 107; House of Councillors, supra note 108.
134. SHAMINTO, KENP6 0 MEGURU GIRON NI TsUITE NO RONTENSEIRI [A COMPEN-
DIUM OF ISSUES CONCERNING THE DEBATES SURROUNDING THE CONSTITUTION] available at
http://www5.sdp.or.jp/central/topics/kenpou0310.html (last visited March 10, 2005).
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to Article 9."' Recent surveys indicate that resistance to revising Article
9, while still strong, has waned. The Yomiuri Shinbun reported that in a
poll conducted in April 2005, 61 percent of respondents favored revising
the constitution to reflect changing times, although only 44 percent of
respondents favored revisions to Article 9.136 In another survey con-
ducted in June 2005 by the Tokyo Shinbun, 42 percent of respondents
said there was no need to revise Article 9, while 35 percent said revi-
sions were necessary. 137 Of those who support change, 48 percent want
the constitutionality of the SDF established, 29 percent want the SDF to
be able to participate in international cooperation, and 20 percent said
limits should be placed on the use of force.I38 Of those polled, 59 per-
cent opposed the right of collective self-defense.
B. The Process
The Japanese understanding of law as a product of consensus under-
scores a deep concern for process. In describing ordinary statutes, Haley
writes: "Once enacted as legislation, legal rules acquire as a result at
least the perception of consensus an exceptional legitimating influence.
Even the most initially controversial legal rules, if enacted after a long
period of discussion and debate, can be viewed as an expression of na-
tional community agreement." '39 This emphasis on discussion and
debate-and the legitimacy that derives from it-reflects two concerns:
first, that every issue be considered thoroughly; and second, that every-
one be heard.
In that vein, as constitutions set out the major structural features of a
polity, they also impose amendment requirements that often place a drag
on the alteration of the structure by ordinary political processes. Under
Article 96, amendments to the Japanese Constitution require the two-
thirds vote of each house in the Diet and ratification by the people
through majority vote at a special referendum or election.'4n Although
these requirements do not appear to be particularly onerous when
135. Commission Report Should Spark Public Debate, ASAHI SHINBUN (Nov. 4, 2002).
See also Shimoyachi Nao, Public More Gradually Accepting of Constitutional Change, JA-
PAN TIMES (May 3, 2004), (reporting that polls indicate a majority favors revisions to the
constitution but opposes changes to Article 9).
136. 61% Support Constitutional Revision, THE DAILY YOMJURI (Apr. 8, 2005), at 2.
137. 64% Say Revision Constitution is Necessary: Poll, Japan Policy & Politics, TOKYO
SHINBUN (June 13, 2005).
138. Id.
139. HALEY, supra note 81, at 36.
140. KENP6, art. 96. At present, this would require 320 out of 480 votes in the House of
Representatives (including the two vacant seats) and 162 out of 242 votes in the House of
Councillors (rounding up).
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compared to other constitutions,14 1 they have set a high bar in the Japa-
nese context. Several commentators observe how the distribution of
power among Japan's parties has made it very difficult to amend the
Constitution. As discussed earlier, the once powerful JSP was opposed
to remilitarization for decades, and the JCP remains so. Honda Akihiro
observes that even during the period when the LDP was clearly domi-
nant, it never held enough seats to meet the two-thirds requirement.' 42 In
his assessment of the unsuccessful attempt to revise the Constitution in
the 1950s and 1960s, John Maki attributes this failure in part to the in-
ability of the LDP to clear the two-thirds hurdle.43
Given these political constraints, great care has been taken to ensure
there is sufficient agreement to meet the two-thirds and majority vote
requirements. For the LDP and the New Komeito, this task is easier fol-
lowing the September elections because the coalition now has enough
seats in the House of Representatives to meet the two-thirds require-
ment. At the same time, this is not the case in the House of Councillors.
In this sense, Article 96 has functioned as a precommitment device as
understood by Elster. It has slowed proceedings, and the achievement of
the two-thirds vote in the House of Councillors and a majority vote in a
referendum will require negotiation among the various deliberative
groups in Japan. Moreover, this process resonates well with the Japa-
nese value on consensus in lawmaking and the legitimizing effect
consensus-based procedures have on the resulting laws.'" Any amend-
ment that survives the Article 96 process will probably receive broad
141. The U.S. Constitution, for example, requires that two-thirds of both houses of
Congress or two-thirds of the legislatures of the states propose any amendments, and that
such amendments be ratified by three-fourths of the states, either through their legislatures or
through constitutional conventions. U.S. CONST. art. V. Honda Akihiro, relying on a study by
the National Diet Library of 71 national constitutions, points out that 61 countries require
super majority votes of the relevant legislative bodies to amend their constitutions. Countries
like Brazil require a three-fifths majority, and Mongolia requires a three-fourths majority
vote. Honda Akihiro, Dai 96j6: Kaisei ni wa takai haadoru [Article 96: for amendments, a
high hurdle] CHUNICHI SHIMBUN, available at http://www.tokyo-np.co.jp/nihonkoku-
k/txt/20050617.html. Honda also observes since the end of the Second World War, Germany
has revised its constitution 51 times, and Italy has revised its constitution 13 times. Of the 71
nations, only Japan and Denmark have not amended their constitutions. Id.
142. Honda, supra note 141. An LDP attempt in 1956 to obtain a greater majority by
proposing that the electoral system be changed to a single-member constituency system was
met with severe criticism. SIMS, supra note 95, at 277-78.
143. John M. Maki, Introduction in JAPAN'S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 32, at 9.
Honda also points out there are still no set provisions for the public referendum in
place. Honda supra note 141.
For a discussion of the debates concerning amendments to Article 96, see House of
Representatives CRC Final Report supra note 1, at 444-50; House of Councillors CRC Final
Report supra note 1, at 213-17.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
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acceptance, not necessarily because of broad agreement on the sub-
stance of the amendment, but because the negotiations between parties,
as required by the clause, give the amendment legitimacy within the
Japanese political environment.
At the same time, Article 96 may have negative effects, an unin-
tended consequence inherent in heuristic tools. Depending on the social
setting, formal requirements for amendment in combination with too
many deliberative groups might lead to deadlock instead of consensus.
If it is too difficult to amend a constitution, the document risks being
unresponsive to the felt needs of a society and thereby losing legitimacy.
Some groups in Japan criticize Article 96 for this reason and press for
revisions to that article. 4 5 Moreover, in the case of Japan, it can be ar-
gued that the difficulty of amending the Constitution, coupled with the
Japanese judiciary's decision not to weigh in on defense matters, 4 6 has
contributed to the perpetuation of the interpretive controversies dis-
cussed in Part I and has in turn raised questions about the effectiveness
and legitimacy of Japanese constitutionalism and of Japanese law in
145. See, e.g., Institute for International Policy Studies, Proposal Concerning Revision
of the Constitution of Japan 4 (2005); Keidanren Position Paper, supra note 115. This does
not mean Article 96 is the sole reason for the caution with which the Japanese leadership is
approaching this process. Some of the care can be attributed in part to fears of an adverse
reaction from the public. See, e.g., SIMs, supra note 95, at 339 (arguing that the LDP re-
frained from seeking amendments to the constitution out of fear of public backlash and the
reaction of the opposition parties).
146. The Constitution of Japan expressly provides for judicial review, KENPO, art. 81,
and from time to time cases have been brought that have challenged the constitutionality of
the SDF or the presence of U.S. bases in Japan. However, the Supreme Court has usually
used a form of the political question doctrine to find that these kinds of controversies are not
within the competence of the courts. In Sakata v. Japan (The Sunakawa Case), 13 KEISHU
3225 (Sup. Ct., Dec. 16, 1959), the Supreme Court of Japan overturned a decision of the
Tokyo High Court and found Article 9 did not prevent Japan from entering into security ar-
rangements with another country. However, it also found it was beyond the scope of judicial
review to determine whether the presence of U.S. military bases in Japan violated Article 9.
In Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries v. Ito (The Naganuma Nike Missile Site
Case II), 27 GY6SAI REISH5 1175 (Sapporo High Ct. Aug. 5, 1976), the Sapporo High Court
found the question of whether the Self-Defense Force was constitutional under Article 9 was
a question of state governance and a political act. These remarks should not be taken as a
criticism of the Japanese judiciary. The Japanese courts are certainly not the only ones that
defer to the political branches in defense and foreign policy. In the United States, for exam-
ple, courts have often used doctrines, such as political question and standing, to refrain from
intervening in government actions when national security or defense policy is involved. In
the U.S. context, this deference is due in large part to the language of the U.S. Constitution,
which expressly empowers the executive and legislative branches to conduct foreign affairs;
to the recognition that the political branches, particularly the executive branch, are better
equipped and structured to frame U.S. foreign and defense policy; and because the political
branches are more directly accountable to the people for foreign policy decisions. Such fac-
tors hold true in Japan as well. It is unclear whether any country has answered to everyone's
satisfaction what role, if any, the courts should or can play when foreign and defense policies
are involved.
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general. 47 Article 96 thus has the potential to harm the Japanese Consti-
tution as well as to protect it.
Because of the high bar set by Article 96, one understands why the
Japanese leadership began its pubic consideration of revisions by estab-
lishing the two constitutional research commissions. 48 Constitutional
study groups and research commissions are tools for consensus with
precedents that reach back to the Meiji Restoration, when the Japanese
government commissioned study groups to investigate other constitu-
tions. This in turn had a major impact on the shape and content of the
Meiji Constitution. 49 The last national constitutional research commis-
sion (often referred to in the literature as the government constitutional
research commission) was active from 1957-1964."0 The precedents for
147. I assess these criticisms more fully in Part III.D. See infra text accompanying
notes 237-244.
148. The present constitutional research commissions were established under amend-
ments to the Diet Law in 2000. Article 102-VI of the law provides: "To conduct broad and
comprehensive research on the Constitution of Japan, a Research Commission on the Consti-
tution shall be set up in each House." Article 9 was just one issue under consideration by the
research commissions. The commissions were charged with engaging in far-reaching inquir-
ies that touched every aspect of the constitution. This included the Constitution's drafting
history; the role of the Constitution in contemporary Japanese society; interpretive issues
raised by subsequent constitutional history; the meaning and significance of the preamble to
the Constitution; the emperor system; national security and international cooperation; human
rights; the political sector (including the Diet, the cabinet, political parties, and the various
ministries); the judiciary; finance; the role of local government; the procedures for constitu-
tional amendments; judicial review; and the means for addressing national emergencies.
House of Representatives CRC Final Report, supra note 1, table of contents (no pagination in
original); House of Councillors CRC Final Report, supra note 1, at xxiii-xxvii. The 1957-64
research commission engaged in the same type of investigations and deliberations. JAPAN'S
COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION supra note 32, at 47-61. Records of both research
commissions are available on the Internet. The House of Representatives Constitutional Re-
search Commission website is located at http://www.shugiin.go.jp/index.nsf/htmlV
indexkenpou.htm. (The site contains the Final Report, information about the commission,
testimony transcripts and submissions, and reports prepared for the commission by commis-
sion staff. The commission also maintains an English website at http://www.
shugiin.go.jp/index.nsf/html/index e-kenpou.htm.). The House of Representatives site con-
tains unofficial English translations of commission proceedings. The commission published
an interim report in November 2002 in English. House of Representatives Research Commis-
sion on the Constitution, Interim Report (Nov. 2002). The House of Representatives Interim
Report also contains summaries of testimony given before the commission.The House of
Councillors Research Commission website is located at
http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/kenpou/index.htm and contains similar transcripts and
reports. As of this writing these records were not available in English.
149. The emphasis on study reaches back to the beginnings of the Japanese state, when
missions were sent to China as Japan was trying to establish its first legal system. Envoys
were sent to China as early as 425 C.E. and scholars sent to China to study Chinese society
and religion participated in the social and legal reforms that transferred power from the clan
leaders to the emperor in the 600s. See W.G. BEASLEY, THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE: A SHORT
HISTORY OF JAPAN 13-23 (1999).
150. An abridged version of the final report of the 1957-64 commission has been trans-
lated into English. JAPAN'S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 32.
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the research commissions of 2000-2005 make any resulting changes
more acceptable by reminding the public that such groups have played
similar roles in prior stages of Japan's history.
While the government constitutional research commission failed to
bring about any changes to the Constitution, even this failure has its
uses. To the extent the Japanese public and other constituent groups are
ambivalent about amending the Constitution, the establishment of the
current research commissions is a relatively benign way to begin a seri-
ous discussion about this difficult topic. Given the history of the last
commission, there was no implication that the establishment of a new
commission would necessarily lead to amendments."' Moreover, the
decision that the commissions would not themselves propose formal
amendments also serves the purposes of reassuring the public, slowing
the process down, and ensuring that there will be yet another round of
debate and negotiations as formal amendments are submitted to the
Diet. If the work of the research commissions results in eventual
amendments to Article 9, it will seem obvious their five-year period of
research and discussion was not necessarily intended to help Japan "get
it right" but instead served to ensure broad acceptance for any final de-
cis 152
151. There are two major differences between the government constitutional research
commission and the present commissions. First, it reported to the cabinet instead of the Diet.
This was criticized by the JSP as unconstitutional because the Diet, not the cabinet, proposes
amendments. Second, the JSP which was then the major opposition party, did not participate
in the 1954-1964 commission. It argued that the commission had been established with the
presumption that amendments would be made. Nait6 Mitsuhiro, Seifukenpdchdsakai ni
arawareta Kaikenkdz5 to Ch6sakai Hihan [The Structure of Constitutional Revision as Re-
vealed in the Government Constitutional Research Commission and a Critique of Research
Commissions] in ZENKOKU KENPO KENKYUKAI KENPOKAISEI MONDAI [PROBLEMS IN CON-
STITUTIONAL REVISION] 48, 48-49 (2005) [hereinafter KENP6KAISEI MONDAI]. Nait6 argues
that the failure of the 1957-1965 commission to bring about amendments had the negative
affect of causing the government through the 1990s to amend the Constitution through rein-
terpretation, thus leaving the Constitution vulnerable to accusations that it was an empty
shell. Id. at 52. The argument that the Constitution has been amended by government inter-
pretation has its origins in the 1950s when Japan began to rearm. Watanabe Yasuyuki, Kenp5
no Kaishaku to Kaisei [Constitutional Interpretation and Amendment], JURiSTO, May 1-15,
at 9 (2005) (describing the origins of the amendment by interpretation debate). See also
Nagaoka Toru, Kenpo Rinen no Teichaku to Kaishakukaiken no Jidai [The Establishment of
the Idea of the Constitution and the Era of Constitutional Amendment Through Interpreta-
tion], in KENPOKAISEI MONDAI, supra, at 53 (discussing the constitutional amendment
through interpretation debate, particularly from the 1960s through 1980s).
152. The current commissions have their critics. Kobayashi Takeshi fears that the com-
missions will reject an understanding that the Constitution, as the work of the people, guides
politics, and instead will bow to political necessity, since the commissions were initiated by
an administration that has, in his view, violated the Constitution by sending forces abroad in
support of the Iraqi invasion and occupation. Kobayashi Takeshi, Kenpd no "Ch6sa" to
"Kaisei" ["Research" and "Revisions" to the Constitution], 15 KENPO MONDAI 150, 155-56
(2004). The Kenp6 Kaiaku Soshi Kakukai Renraku Kaigi is also critical of the commissions'
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C. Bricolage in the Substantive Debate
Both legal restraints and a penchant for consensus require the vari-
ous deliberative groups in Japan to engage with one another. Is
consensus emerging from this process? The Japanese are involved in a
far-ranging and thorough examination of the substantive issues relevant
to changing Article 9. These issues include: the value of pacifism to Ja-
pan; the history of the framing and subsequent interpretation of Article
9; Japan's security needs; the importance of the U.S.-Japan security re-
lationship (including the impact of the U.S. military presence in Japan,
particularly Okinawa); the value of Japan's participation in the United
Nations and its activities; the impact any changes will have on Japan's
relations with other countries; civilian control over the military; and the
role of the military in emergencies. On a more technical level are issues
regarding the proper balance between text and interpretation: to what
extent does the resolution of Japan's security issues require changes to
the text of Article 9 and to what extent can it be left to interpretation?
Space does not allow for discussion of all these issues, or of all the
arguments being raised for and against the various solutions being of-
fered. It is apparent the major deliberative groups support retaining the
war renunciation clause in paragraph 1,113 while collective self-defense
remains controversial. To show how bricolage affects the substance of
the debate, I will focus on the use of force for self-defense. Four views
on this issue emerged from the House of Representatives Constitutional
Research Commission: first, the Constitution should be amended to
clarify the constitutionality of the SDF and the right to use force for
self-defense; second, provisions governing the SDF and the exercise of
the right of self-defense should be added to the Constitution; third, Arti-
cle 9 should remain unchanged while the principle of minimum
work. Like Kobayashi, the organization argues that the commissions, from the beginning,
were predisposed to recommend amendments to the Constitution. It further argues that both
research commissions went well beyond their legislative mandate to engage in far-reaching
investigations on the Constitution. It also claims the final reports fail to adequately represent
the extent to which the public strongly supports Article 9. Shusan Kenp6 Ch~sakai no Hdko-
kusho Teishutsu ni Atatte [Concerning the Release of the House of Representatives, House of
Councillors Constitutional Research Commissions' Final Reports] (2005). See also Tsukada
Noriyuki, et al., Kokkai Kenp6 Chdsakai [The Diet Constitutional Research Commissions] in
KENP6KAISEI MONDAI, supra note 151, at 76 (describing similar criticisms).
153. See supra text accompanying notes 82-134. This was also confirmed in the com-
mission final reports. As the House of Councillors Report puts it, "Heiwashugi no igi, rinen o
kenji subeki koto wa kenp5 chdsakai ni okeru kydts0i no ninshiki deatta." ["It was the con-
sensus of the constitutional research commission that [we] should hold fast to the meaning
and idea of pacifism."] House of Councillors CRC Final Report, supra note 1, at 66 (empha-
sis in original). See also BEER & MAKI, supra note 4, at 115 ("Political parties and opinion
leaders have now nearly reached a consensus on support for Paragraph 1 of Article 9 but not
on Paragraph 2 or its proper interpretation.").
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necessary force for self-defense is affirmed; and fourth, Article 9 should
continue to prohibit the use of force in exercising the right of self-
defense.
Members of the House of Councillors Constitutional Research
Commission agreed that Japan, as an independent sovereign nation, has
the right to independent self-defense. 154 Unlike the House of Representa-
tives commission, the House of Councillors commission was in
agreement that it is necessary to have an organization like the SDF
through which Japan can exercise the minimum force necessary for self-
defense. Like the House of Representatives commission, however, it was
divided on whether the constitutionality of such an organization should
be made express."' Thus, although it appears there is a growing consen-
sus that Japan has or should have the right to use force to defend itself,
there is at least a significant minority that opposes this, and even among
those who agree on the issue of self-defense, there is currently no con-
sensus about whether revisions to Article 9 should be made.
The question arises as to whether further movement towards con-
sensus on these issues is possible. Sunstein writes, "When people have a
fixed view about some highly salient public issue, they are likely to have
heard a wide range of arguments in various directions, producing a full
argument pool, and additional discussion is not likely to produce
movement."'' 1 6 This identifies a problem with using the deliberation
process to assess various argument pools. Aiky6 Kfji, who also applies
a precommitment framework to the amendment debates, argues that al-
lowing the constitution to function as a precommitment device enables
Japan to fully evaluate the various arguments for and against amend-
ments to Article 9.157 Aiky6, who favors a pacifist interpretation of
Article 9, contends this is particularly important in the post-9/1 I world
when others claim it is urgent for Japan to increase its defense capabil-
ity. ' Sunstein's comment, however, raises yet another issue: if a
constitutionally mandated process requires too much time, it may allow
people to form counterarguments to opposing arguments and thereby
become even more entrenched in their positions. The waxing and wan-
ing of the debates about Article 9 over the past 60 years makes this a
real possibility. "9 Under those circumstances, coming up with fresh
154. House of Councillors CRC Final Report, supra note 1, at 73.
155. Id. at 80.
156. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 29.
157. Aikyo K6ji, Kenp5 ni yoru Purikomittmento [Precommitment Through the Consti-
tution], JURISTO, May 1-15, at 2, 7 (2005).
158. Id. Aiky6 also describes the work of Hasebe Yasuo, who argues Article 9 functions
as a precommitment device that prevented a return to militarism, Id. at 6-7.
159. For example, in 1962, Kobayashi Naoki wrote that the debate on Article 9 had
become tiresome and that the arguments by the various parties were well known. Kobayashi
Fall 2005]
Michigan Journal of International Law
arguments is difficult. Three of the recurring themes arising in the de-
bates on the issue of self-defense-the drafting history of Article 9;
limits on constitutional revisions; and the perennial yet ever-changing
nature of threats to national security-show how bricolage in substan-
tive debates makes consensus challenging.
1. The Drafting History of Article 9
Anyone who studies the establishment of the postwar Constitution
cannot help but be struck by the drama of the events as they unfolded.
Many of them have taken on a mythic quality: the Potsdam Declara-
tion's vision for a postwar Japan;'6 the utter devastation following the161
war; the Emperor's first radio address to the people announcing sur-
render;1 62 the force of Douglas MacArthur's personality;' 63 the Mainichi
Shinbun's premature publication of the Matsumoto committee's draft
constitution, a draft unacceptable to the Allies;'6 MacArthur's decision
that the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP) General
Headquarters (GHQ) Government Section would draft a "model" consti-165 /
tution of its own; his three points, including the renunciation of war;' 66
Naoki, Kaikenron no Ronri to Shinwa [The Logic and Myth of the Constitutional Revision
Issue], SEKAi No. 193, reprinted in KENP6 KAISEI SEIRON [Constutional Revision: Argu-
ments] 201, 208 (Hasegawa Masayasu & Mori Hideki eds. 1977) . He then responded to a
number of arguments made in favor of amending the constitution. Several of the arguments
and Kobayashi's responses are used today. For example, Kobayashi rejected an argument that
as an independent country, it is natural for Japan to have a military. Id. at 209. He argues
through Article 9, Japan has taken the initiative by deciding not to maintain armed forces. Id.
at 209. Variations of this argument and counterargument were made before the current re-
search commissions. See House of Representatives CRC Final Report, supra note 1, at 303-
05.
160. Proclamation Calling for the Surrender of Japan, Approved by the Heads of Gov-
ernment of the United States, China, and the United Kingdom (July 26, 1945) in 2 FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: CONFERENCE OF BERLIN (POTSDAM) 1945, at 1474 (U.S.
Dep't of State, 1960).
161. See DOWER, supra note 4, at 45-64 (discussing conditions in Japan following
surrender).
162. This was the first time that the emperor had directly spoken to his subjects. For a
discussion of the speech and its impact, see id at 33-39.
163. General MacArthur was Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan. As
Mikiso Hane puts it, "[tihe strong personality of General MacArthur made the occupation of
Japan a one-man show. Still, his forceful leadership, self-assurance, dignified bearing, sense
of mission, and astute political acumen won him the respect of the Japanese." HANE, supra
note 105, at 367.
164. The committee, headed by the eminent legal scholar, Matsumoto J6ji, was charged
with revising the Meiji Constitution. It produced a draft whose provisions for civil liberties
were not satisfactory to the Allies. DOWER, supra note 4, at 351-55. This draft was published
in the Mainichi newspaper without permission of the committee. Id. at 359.
165. Id. at 360.
166. See infra text accompanying note 188. The speed with which the Constitution was
crafted lends credence to Tushnet's observations about bricolage in constitutional design: "A
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the completion of the GHQ draft within six days; 67 the surprise of the
Japanese leadership as they were presented with the English draft; '61 the
"translation marathon"' 69 as SCAP and the Japanese hammered out a
Japanese version; 70 the presentation of the draft to the public; 7' the Diet
debates; the Ashida Amendment; 73 and approval by the Privy Council
and the Emperor.'74 It is not surprising that a significant portion of the
work of both the 1957-1964 and 2000-2005 commissions involved
studies of the Constitution's origins or that the intentions of the framers
continue to inform Japanese jurisprudence.
Like all cultural tools, history (as well as other types of narratives),
has both positive and negative effects. To quote Balkin at length:
Narratives are useful memory structures precisely because they
select and organize our experience-they categorize and store
events into scripts or indices that we can use for later compre-
hension and comparison. Narratives are useful tools [for]
understanding because they create social expectations that
frame our understanding of what is and should be happening;
without such expectations, we literally would not know what to
expect.175
Despite their usefulness, narratives have their limitations.
Because narrative structures work in these ways, they necessar-
ily lead our understanding in some directions rather than others.
They categorize future experience in terms of preexisting indi-
ces and expectations. This produces the familiar trade-off of any
heuristic-although these expectations may be good enough for
some purposes, they may seriously hinder our understanding
and promote injustice in others. 176
constitution is assembled from provisions that a constitution's drafters selected almost at
random from whatever happened to be at hand when the time came to deal with a particular
problem." Tushnet, supra note 67, at 1287.
167. DOWER, supra note 4, at 364-73 (discussing the GHQ drafting session).
168. Id. at 374-75.
169. This is John Dower's term. Id. at 379.
170. Id. at 379-83.
171. Id. at 383-87.
172. Id. at 391-404.
173. See infra text accompanying notes 194-198.
174. Lawrence W. Beer, The Present Constitutional System of Japan, in CONSTITU-
TIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY ASIA 175, 180 (Lawrence W. Beer ed.,
1992).
175. BALKIN, supra note 3, at 208-09.
176. Id. at 208-09
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As an example of how narratives can direct yet limit one's under-
standing, consider the following summary of the report of the 1957-
1964 Constitutional Research Commission Subcommittee on the Proc-
ess of the Enactment of the Constitution after it had recounted the
drafting history: "In essence, it is clear that the Constitution of Japan is
the product of a lost war," the military occupation, and the destitution of
the people. 177 In reflecting on those turbulent times, the subcommittee
stated:
[T]he process of the enactment of the Constitution was both ex-
tremely peculiar and abnormal and the facts were extremely
complex. In respect to the problem of whether the process was
either imposed or forced on Japan or, in other words, whether it
was based on the freely expressed will of the Japanese people,
the facts are by no means simple.
Thus, at least two themes emerge from the 1957-1964 commission
account. First, despite the vague language, the strong implication is that
the Constitution was forced on the Japanese people, and its legitimacy is
thereby in question. The second theme, that the process was jury-rigged,
strengthens this criticism. The subcommittee uses a narrative of unusual
circumstances and unexpected twists and turns to show the story does
not develop as one might expect. The report is clear on this point:
"[T]he enactment of this Constitution was carried out in an extremely
unusual manner, if one considers what the form of enactment of a na-
tion's constitution should actually be."'
179
The 1957-1964 report is a more subtle version of a narrative of im-
position widely debated in the 1950s and 1960s and continuing to this
day. In 1954, for example, the Jiyfit6 political party argued the govern-
ment's position (that Japan has the right to defend itself under
international law but cannot do so under Article 9) was a foolish one
that could only be taken by a completely defeated country such as Ja-
pan. 1" ° In 1994, Ichiro Ozawa could still say, "it seems abnormal to me
that a constitution imposed by the occupation authorities continues to
function after Japan has become an independent nation."'' This narra-
tive's strength is that it captures a truth about the Constitution in general
177. JAPAN'S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, at 85-86.
178. Id. at 86.
179. Id.
180. Jiy5t6 Kenp6 Ch6sakai [Liberal Party Constitutional Research Commission], Ni-
honkokukenp6 Kaiseian Y6k6 Narabi ni Setsumeisho [Outline and Explanation of Proposed
Revisions to the Constitution of Japan] (Nov. 5, 1954), reprinted in KENP6 "KAISEI" NO
STEN, supra note 17, at 502, 509.
181. Ozawa Ichiro, A Proposal for Reforming the Japanese Constitution, reprinted in
HOOK & MCCORMACK, supra note 12, at 161.
[Vol. 27:55
Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan
and Article 9 in particular: they were imposed by a foreign occupation,
and the way in which they were imposed runs counter to Japanese val-
ues on deliberation and consensus. That fact leads to the argument that
the document failed to take into account other Japanese values and
served occupation interests as much as or more than Japanese inter-
ests. 11 The imposition narrative thereby creates momentum in favor of
questioning the legitimacy of the Constitution and of amending it to
make it more Japanese.
Despite its strengths, however, the narrative of imposition has at
least two weaknesses. First, it masks Japan's oppressive past. One critic
of the argument states:
As for those who use the constitutional issue of imposition as a
reason for establishing an independent one, I would like them to
answer: in reality, which is more desirable for human life and
activity-the institutionalized protections of popular sover-
eignty, fundamental human rights, and pacifism now ours-or, a
national system under the Constitution of the Empire of Japan,
with supreme authority in the emperor, an oppressive system
aided by the Peace Preservation Laws and the Imperial Rule As-
sistance Association, governmental authorities that ignored
established legal procedure, and women tied to the household
system without political protection?"'
Second, the imposition theory runs counter to another narrative. Al-
though the Allies had tremendous influence in the establishment of the
Constitution, the vast majority of the Japanese citizenry, who felt be-
trayed by the wartime leadership, 1 quickly embraced the new
Constitution, including Article 9. The values implicit in the Constitution
have become ingrained in Japanese society over the past 60 years, in
part, precisely because of Article 9. As John Dower puts it, "[a]lthough
Article 9 has been battered and bent to permit an increasingly expansive
interpretation of what is permissible in the name of maintaining a 'self-
defense' capacity, it has survived (together with the strong antiwar
182. Arguments to that effect were made before the commissions. See House of Repre-
sentatives CRC Final Report, supra note 1, at 254; House of Councillors CRC Final Report,
supra note 1, at 41-42.
183. House of Representatives CRC Final Report, supra note 1, at 256. The Peace Pres-
ervation Law was actually a series of laws used to quell domestic unrest and dissent. See
MASON & CAIGER, supra note 100, at 290, 319, 331. The Imperial Rule Assistance Associa-
tion was established after the political parties were dissolved in 1940 and was designed to
inculcate the general populace with national policies and values. IAN BURUMA, INVENTING
JAPAN: 1853-1964, at 113 (2003).
184. DOWER, supra note 4, at 65-84.
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language of the preamble) as a still-compelling statement of nonbellig-
erency.' ' 115 He observes further:
[E]very contretemps about rearmament has necessarily entailed
reengagement with basic issues of war and peace (and law and
constitutional guarantees in general) in a way inconceivable
elsewhere. In such unplanned ways, the early occupation ideals
of 'demilitarization and democratization' have remained a living
part of popular consciousness for over a half-century.1
86
Thus, two competing narratives of the Constitution's origins continue to
vie for influence in the revision debates.
Different narratives also appear in the debates about the interpreta-
tion of Article 9, particularly regarding whether or not the article allows
Japan to use force for self-defense. It is well understood that the intent
of the drafters, assuming it can be determined, is not necessarily as im-
portant in interpreting a document as are the actual language and
subsequent applications of the document. 8 Nevertheless, many are still
185. Id. at 562. The theme of acceptance and assimilation was brought up as early as
six years after the constitution was established and continues today. Asahi Shinbun, no
Ch6t6hateki Kenpfshingi Kikan Setchi Teian [Non-partisan Constitutional Investigation
Group Establishment Proposals], May 3, 1953, reprinted in KENP6 "KAISEI" NO SOTEN,
supra note 17, at 472, 473 (arguing that when the Constitution was established the large
majority of the people probably expressed heartfelt agreement with the spirit of democracy
which lies at the bottom of the Constitution). See also Masami Ito, The Modern Development
of Law and Constitution in Japan (Keiko Beer & Masako Kamiya trans.), in CONSTITU-
TIONAL SYSTEMS IN LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY ASIA 129, 144 (Lawrence W. Beer ed.,
1992) ("Even though it was drafted by foreigners, the Constitution of 1947 has enjoyed the
general support of the public and is considered the most suitable postwar constitution for
Japan, preferable to all the other constitutional drafts by Japanese, including that of the Japa-
nese Government."). Yoichi Higuchi argues that "without constitutionalism, Japan could not
have achieved modernity." Yoichi Higuchi, The 1946 Constitution: Its Meaning in the World-
wide Development of Constitutionalism in FIVE DECADES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM supra note
4, at 3. For Higuchi, the Constitution did so by placing greater value on the individual: "As
the ultimate legal authority, it validated reforms in Japan's social and economic structures
that undergirded postwar democracy. The Constitution designed a society around an intellec-
tual value-respect for the individual-that replaced veneration for the emperor." Id. at 5.
Land reform, labor law, and women's rights were all anchored in constitutional provisions.
Id. at 5-6. Another argument raised at the commission hearings was that during the war,
Japan strayed from the path of freedom, peace, and human rights. Defeat and the new Consti-
tution marked a return to that path. House of Councillors CRC Final Report, supra note 1, at
42. On a more mundane level, there is the argument that regardless of who was responsible
for the first draft, GHQ and the Japanese leadership worked together to make the final prod-
uct. House of Representatives CRC Final Report, supra note 1, at 255. Arai Akira made the
same argument in 1981. ARAI AKIRA, KENPO DAIKYiJ6 TO ANPO, JIETAI [Article 9 of the
Constitution and the Japan-U.S. Security Agreement, Self Defense Force] 30 (1981).
186. DOWER, supra note 4, at 562.
187. Some members of the House of Councillors Constitutional Research Commission
were very much prepared to move beyond the question of origins to questions about what the
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concerned with what the Allies and the Japanese leadership intended.
One of the best known arguments raised in favor of the use of force is
that although General MacArthur instructed the GHQ Government Sec-
tion to provide that Japan was to renounce war "even for preserving its• ,,188
own security, an express provision to that effect never made it into
the GHQ draft. lokibe Makoto argues, based on interviews with Charles
Kades (who was responsible for drafting Article 9), that Kades worried
that requiring Japan to renounce force even for self-defense was too
drastic. If such language was put into the document, the Japanese gov-
ernment would quickly repeal the whole Constitution once occupation
ended, thus jeopardizing many of the new reforms written into the draft.
To ensure the Constitution's survival, the drafters omitted the language
(according to Iokibe) with the approval of MacArthur and Courtney
Whitney, head of the GHQ Government Division."'
lokibe further argues that the GHQ's true intentions were never
communicated to the Japanese leadership. This allows him to claim the
GHQ never intended to deny Japan the right to use force in its defense
and simultaneously explain how so many among the Japanese leadership
believed the final draft did just that,190 as evidenced by Prime Minister
Yoshida's famous statement during the Diet debates on the draft.' 9' But
Iokibe's account does not (and in fairness to lokibe does not purport to)
explain whether the understanding of the GHQ or that of the Japanese
leadership is controlling. 92 One could argue that if the Diet, as the body
that debated and approved the Constitution (subject to the approval of
Constitution has meant over the past 50 years and what it means for the future. House of
Councillors CRC Final Report, supra note 1, at 41.
188. MacArthur Notes (Feb. 4, 1946), available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/
shiryo/03/072shoshi.htm.
189. House of Councillors CRC Remarks of Experts, supra note 5, at 294 (remarks of
lokibe Matoto). Kitaoka Shinichi agrees that MacArthur's instruction was omitted because
Kades thought such a restriction was too drastic. House of Representatives CRC Final Re-
port, supra note 1, at 267.
190. House of Councillors CRC Remarks of Experts, supra note 5, at 294 (remarks of
lokibe Matoto).
191. Yoshida states, "I think that the very recognition of such a thing (for a State to
wage war in legitimate self-defense) is harmful. (applause) It is a notable fact that most mod-
em wars have been waged in the name of the self-defense of States. It seems to me,
therefore, that the recognition of the right of self-defense provides the cause for starting a
war." SH6ICHI, THE BIRTH OF JAPAN'S POSTWAR CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 193 (cita-
tions omitted).
192. One also wonders whether GHQ would not have communicated its intentions to
the Japanese during the Diet debates. Everyone understood that GHQ was monitoring the
proceedings very closely. DOWER, supra note 4, at 391. Certainly, GHQ would have had
ample opportunity to clarify any misunderstandings about the import of Article 9 if it wished
to.
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the Privy Council and the Emperor), believed it was renouncing the use
of force for self-defense, this belief should control.
The problem of determining whose intent controls arises in argu-
ments for a restrictive interpretation of Article 9. Watanabe Osamu
argues the Allies' main concern was that Japan never again be a threat to
international peace and security. They had failed to prevent Germany
from rearming following the First World War, and they were determined
to not make the same mistake-Japan should thus never rearm, for any
reason. 93 This argument demonstrates how framing the narrative can
have an impact on the result: is it better in some sense to use a broad
frame to determine the Occupation authorities' intent about the use of
force or to use Jokibe's more narrowly framed account of Kades, Whit-
ney, and MacArthur's purported intent? Moreover, Watanabe and
lokibe's accounts are similar in at least one respect: they focus on
American intentions, again raising the question of why the GHQ's aspi-
rations about the use of force are so important to the interpretation of
Article 9, particularly if the Japanese had a different understanding of
what they were adopting.
Another important part of the "lore" of the drafting history is the
possibility of overt and covert intentions. Proponents of the use of force
point out that when the final language of Article 9 was hammered out in
closed-door negotiations between the GHQ and the Japanese, the draft-
ers agreed to insert the phrase that begins paragraph 2: "in order to
accomplish the aim of' paragraph 1. According to proponents of the use
of force, the drafters purposefully placed this phrase in the document so
when read together with the phrase in paragraph 1 ("[a]spiring sincerely
to an international peace based on justice and order"), the "war poten-
tial" renounced in paragraph 2 could be interpreted as a capacity for
aggressive war that would disturb international peace, not a capacity to
engage in self-defense.' 94 Furthermore, the argument continues, this
somewhat ambiguous language is in the draft precisely to allow for an
interpretation in favor of force. This is the so-called Ashida Amendment.
193. House of Councillors CRC Remarks of Experts, supra note 5, at 278-79 (remarks
of Watanabe Osamu).
194. DOWER, supra note 4, at 396. The GHQ draft submitted to the Japanese govern-
ment provided:
War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. The threat or use of force is
forever renounced as a means for settling disputes with any other nation.
No army, navy, air force, or other war potential will ever be authorized and no
rights of belligerency will ever be conferred by the State.
Government Branch, General Headquarters, Constitution of Japan Art. XIII (Feb. 12, 1946),
available at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryo/O3/O76shoshi.html.
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Ashida Hitoshi, who chaired the House of Representatives subcommit-
tee on constitutional revision, later claimed he had asked for and
received permission to make these changes precisely to allow for this
interpretation.'9 As discussed earlier, lokibe argues that the GHQ was
complicit in this move.196
Yamauchi Toshihiro and Ota Kazuo respond that it does not matter
what Ashida thought privately; only his public comments should con-
trol. They argue that Ashida never alluded to the possibility of retaining
forces for self-defense in his formal remarks before the Diet. 197 They
also quote excerpts from stenographic notes of the subcommittee made
public in 1995, in which Ashida described his motivation for suggesting
the first phrase in paragraph 2 as two-fold: to make the rest of the pas-
sage flow better in Japanese and to clarify that Japan's trust in the
international system in paragraph 1 made it possible to renounce air and
sea forces in paragraph 2.198
Although competing accounts of the constitutional history persist,
the dispute is often over meaning, not facts. The problem of meaning
makes it fitting that the interpretive issues surrounding the right to use
force in self-defense are often referred to as "theological" problems. The
phrase is used somewhat disparagingly to liken the debate on the use of
force to metaphysical issues with no resolution.'9 The problem, how-
ever, is not restricted to theology; any narrative of a shared social
history, even one involving a relatively circumscribed question such as
the intentions of drafters regarding the use of force, creates meanings by
the mere fact that it is impossible for any one narrative to account for all
events. This is so not necessarily because of any ulterior motive, but be-
cause narratives are not "designed" to be so inclusive. 200 Paradoxically,
the simpler the narrative, the harder it is to account for the complexity
of events as they unfold; the more nuanced the narrative, the less effec-
tive it is in marshalling support for or against a particular position.
195. DOWER, supra note 4, at 396.
196. House of Councillors CRC Remarks of Experts, supra note 5, at 294 (remarks of
lokibe Matoto). Nishi Osamu argues the Far East Committee was aware the Ashida Amend-
ment could be interpreted as allowing Japan to use force in self-defense. House of
Representatives CRC Final Report, supra note 1, at 267 (remarks of Nishi Osamu).
197. KENP6 TO HEIWA SHUGI, supra note 18, at 8-9.
198. Id. Arai also argues the Ashida Amendment was inserted to strengthen the link
between the reliance on the international system and Japan's renunciation of force for any
reason, not to create a loophole. ARAI, supra note 185, at 44-47.
199. See, e.g., Keidanren Position Paper, supra note 115, ch.4 (arguing that the "debate
over interpretation of Article 9 has long been 'theological'..." and seemingly endless).
200. This, I think, dovetails nicely with Berger's conclusion, in his examination of
German and Japanese antimilitarism, that "[i]n the final analysis, German and Japanese an-
timilitarism can best be explained by each nation's struggle to draw lessons from its troubled
past." BERGER, supra note 82, at 6.
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2. Constitutional Revision or Revolution
In 1953, constitutional scholars Miyazawa Toshiyoshi and Hase-
gawa Moriyasu discussed whether the Constitution, then eight years old,
should be revised.2  Asked whether there were limits to what could be
changed, Hasegawa responded that at a minimum, no changes could be
made that would touch the three principles embodied in the preamble:
202popular sovereignty, pacifism, and political morality (seiji detoku).
Miyazawa agreed that some principles, such as popular sovereignty,
were sacrosanct and could not be changed short of revolution, but he
disputed that the renunciation of war was untouchable. Since other de-
mocracies maintain military forces, he argued, there is no inherent
inconsistency between democracy and rearmament.20 ' This discussion
made clear that although one could agree that a constitution cannot be
amended so as to change its fundamental guiding principles, it is diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to identify those principles. Further, Miyazawa
and Hasegawa did not consider whether such limits exist at all. As a le-
gal matter, why is it not possible for a democracy to choose to make far-
reaching changes in its organization under the constitutionally mandated
rules for doing so?
These issues have never been fully resolved despite being raised be-
fore both the 1957-1964 commission 24 and the current commissions. In
remarks before the House of Councillors Research Commission, Urabe
Noriho argued Article 9 cannot be changed through the normal amend-
ment process. In his view, ordinary amendments to a constitution
205presuppose the existence of the constitution being amended °. If, how-
ever, the purported amendments damage the constitution's identity
(d5issei) or continuity (keizokusei), then in reality, such changes consti-
tute an annulment of the existing constitution and the establishment of a
new one. This cannot happen through the normal amendment process
without calling into serious question the legitimacy of both the preexist-
206ing constitution and the new one.
According to Urabe, the proposed changes to the Constitution fall
outside of the scope of ordinary amendments in part because Article 9 is
201. Zadankai: Kenp6 wa Kaisei subeki ka Hi ka? [Symposium: Should the Constitu-
tion be Revised or Not?] 1 CHU6 K6RON No. 68 (1953) reprinted in KENP6 KAISEI SEIRON,
supra note 159, at 170.
202. Id. at 171.
203. Id. at 172-73.
204. JAPAN'S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, at 345. According to
the report, the commission rejected "a stipulation in the present Constitution clearly specify-
ing either limitations or no limitations on amendment." Id.
205. House of Councillors CRC Remarks of Experts, supra note 5, at 410 (Statement of
Urabe Noriho)
206. Id.
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involved. For Urabe, changing Article 9 to allow the use of force in self-
defense, let alone repealing the war renunciation clause, involves
changes to not only those provisions but to the very structure of the
Constitution itself.207 He rejects claims that changes to paragraph 2 alone
would not affect the identity of the Constitution. In his view, paragraph
2 must be read alongside both paragraph 1 and the preamble, which
taken together have value as a historical matter and as an example for
other world constitutions. Furthermore, any change to paragraph 2
would involve a change to the Japanese commitment to peace, one of
the bases of Japan's modem identity.
Takehana Mitsunori takes the opposite view. For Takehana, nothing
limits what can be revised. He makes no distinction between core and
non-core constitutional provisions. The people are sovereign, and by
definition a sovereign is not restricted. In his view, the establishment of
the requirements for amending the Constitution and any substantive
amendments are applications of the same sovereignty-as long as the
state exercises sovereignty as prescribed by the Constitution, such
amendments are legal. 209 Takehana is supported in this view by Doi Ma-
sakazu"1 who uses precommitment concepts in his approach. He begins
with social contract theory to explain why people cede authority to gov-
ernments. At the same time, like Elster and Sunstein, he recognizes
21,
people make mistakes through time-inconsistency and other causes.
Thus, it is reasonable for the framers of a constitutional system to estab-
lish practices beforehand that will enable societies to make well-
212
considered decisions and avoid making hasty ones. In Doi's view,
however, such restraints are not applied blindly; if people critically dis-
cern whether amendments address changed circumstances, this is
sufficient security for a constitutional system. As long as the change
does not involve the locus of sovereignty, Doi argues, the problem of
constitutional limits on amendments turns into an issue of whether
enough restraints have been put into place to avoid quick decisions, not
whether higher-order restraints render immutable some constitutional
207. Id. at 413.
208. Id. Urabe also argues that the comprehensive nature of the amendments being
considered, as well as the possible revision of Article 96 itself, indicates that what is being
contemplated is not a revision of the existing Constitution but the establishment of a new
one. Id. at 413-14. Some of Urabe's views are available in English in Noriho Urabe, What is
Constitutional 'Amendment'? (Mar. 31, 2004), available at
http://www.jicl.jp/english/related/backnumber/20040331 .html.
209. House of Councillors CRC Remarks of Experts, supra note 5, at 414, 415-16
(Statement of Takehana Mitsunori).
210. House of Councillors CRC Remarks of Experts, supra note 5, at 419 (Statement of
Doi Masakazu).
211. Id. at 421.
212. Id. at 422.
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provisions. For Doi, it is thus legally justified to consider whether Arti-
cle 9 should be amended to adapt to new circumstances.1 3
A claim that certain provisions like Article 9 are not subject to
amendment because they involve Japan's core national identity has pre-
clusive effect-one could not change Article 9 and still be under the
ambit of the current Constitution. The issue of whether or not essential
elements of a national identity can be altered without a fresh mandate is
one seriously discussed among constitutional scholars.21 4 Under a ver-
sion of this argument, Sunstein himself argues that a constitution should
not allow the right to secession, in part because it contradicts the idea of
211a deliberative democracy.
In the Japanese context, however, this argument is in danger of
swallowing itself. Miyazawa, who was part of the 1953 discussion, is
famous for his argument that the 1947 Constitution was really a revolu-
213. Id. at 423-24. Arguments like these caused a split among the commission mem-
bers as to whether or not such limits exist. Those who took the position that there are no
limits argued that an opposite view would tie the hands of future generations. Furthermore,
although other constitutions do provide that certain sections may not be amended, it should
not be concluded that the people of Japan have that intention. Finally, such limitations could
make the constitution unresponsive to emergencies. House of Councillors CRC Final Report,
supra note 1, at 213. Those who took the position that there are limits argued that, at a mini-
mum, Article 96's requirement of a national vote could not be changed. Others, however,
argued that even if there were such limits and a constitutional revision breached those limits,
the debate might be meaningless as a legal matter because there is no system for invalidating
that revision. The limitation debate, however, still has great meaning as a political claim. Id.
214. For a discussion of the scholarly debate on this issue in Japan see Akasaka Masa-
hiro, Kenp(5kaisei no Genkai [Limits on Constitutional Revision], JURISTO, May 1-15, at 18
(2005).
215. SUNSTEIN, supra note 2, at 95-114. Along these lines, Hasebe Yasuo argues in an
interesting twist that it is the pacifist interpretation of Article 9 that is antithetical to constitu-
tionalism. Following John Rawls, Hasebe asserts that in a liberal democracy made of people
with incommensurable understandings of the good, there must be a line between private and
public spheres so persons can pursue their private goals and yet engage in public discourse
and reasoning apart from their private worldviews. This preserves a "fragile balance" be-
tween one's own views of the good and diverse society. Yasuo Hasebe, Constitutional
Borrowing and Political Theory, 1 INT'L J. CONST. L. 224, 240 (2003). For Hasebe, "[in
order to maintain the fragile balance of social collaboration while safeguarding privately held
values, the forum of public deliberation must be vigilantly defended from invasion and occu-
pation by any single comprehensive worldview." Id. at 240-41. According to Hasebe, a literal
interpretation of Article 9 essentially transforms the provision into such a comprehensive
worldview because that interpretation can only be understood as a moral commitment to
pacifism. Those who support pacifism are in essence attempting to impose this viewpoint on
others in Japanese society. Id. at 242. It is not within the scope of this Article to give a thor-
ough response to Hasebe's argument. However, at least one question can be raised. Even if
we grant Hasebe's understanding of liberalism, does the Constitution protect a particular
political philosophy any more than it protects a particular economic philosophy? It may be
that Hasebe's understanding of liberalism is as much a worldview as is a pacifist worldview.
The concept of bricolage indicates that it is quite possible for the framers of a constitution to
embed not one, but several worldviews in the text, or for subsequent interpreters of the text
to use various parts to further a particular worldview.
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tionary document disguised as a revision of the Meiji Constitution. Mi-
yazawa observed it was generally accepted among students of the Meiji
Constitution that there were limits to what could be revised under that
Constitution. The amendments of 1946 transferred national sovereignty
from the emperor to the people (in all probability explaining why Doi
believes that a change in the locus of sovereignty is an exception to his
position that all aspects of a constitution are subject to amendment). In
Miyazawa's view, this was so fundamental a change to Japan's national
being under the Meiji Constitution that it did not constitute a revision-
it was the product of revolution.116 Even if it was not Miyazawa's inten-
tion, such a critique challenges the legitimacy of the purported
amendments of 1946, including Article 9. It is hard to argue a revision
that transfers power from the emperor to the people is less fundamental
than a revision that determines whether a nation may lawfully use force.
Thus, taken to its logical end, an argument that Article 9 is immutable
because it is fundamental to the structure or identity of the Japanese
state calls into question the legitimacy of that very structure or identity.
Of course, one can avoid this conundrum by claiming that all matters in
a constitution are open to revision. But while there is always the tempta-
tion to make some topics off limits, as Doi and Miyazawa do, this
allows others like Hasegawa and Urabe to argue that other issues, like
the use of force, should be off limits as well. Such is the nature of con-
ceptual tools.
3. Perennial, Yet Ever-Changing Threats to National Security
Nowhere does the multifunctional nature of heuristics become more
apparent than in national security. No one doubts the value of the heuris-
tic tools, both mental and physical, that enable human beings to identify
threats and respond to them. In this respect, the "just good enough"
quality of such tools is quite good indeed."' At the same time, most ac-
knowledge such tools can be misapplied: a person can see a threat where
none exists or mischaracterize the nature of a threat, often with the unin-
tended consequence of creating real threats or magnifying existing
216. Zadankai: Kenp5 wa Kaisei subeki ka Hi ka?, supra note 201, at 171-72; KoSEKI,
supra note 4, at 124-29. Miyazawa also argued that one of the main weaknesses of the Con-
stitution is that it had not been submitted to the public for consideration and vote. Miyazawa
Toshiyoshi, Kenpdkaisei Mondai no Kangaekata [Ways of Thinking about the Problem of
Constitutional Revision], JURISTO (1955), reprinted in KENP6 KAISEI SEIRON, supra note
159, at 156, 159-60.
217. As Balkin puts it, "Not all [conceptual tools are] limiting or distorting for the pur-
pose at hand ... and not all limitations or distortions are relevant in all contexts ......
BALKIN, supra note 3, at 128.
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ones-hence the need for precommitment strategies that try to negate
these effects.
The issue is complicated further when a constitution is involved. A
constitution provides a democracy's solution, its meta-heuristic, to the
question of how society will protect itself, including the precommitment
strategies it will use as it does so. If that solution is incorrect or incom-
plete, with the result of placing a nation's security or other societal
values such as civil liberties at risk, the effectiveness and legitimacy of
the constitution are called into question.
As a result, the question of whether Article 9 should be amended is
complex because it involves at least two related variables. First is the
nature of the threats Japan faces and how Japan should respond to them
(made even more complex by Japan's reliance on the United States for
its defense). Second is the role of Article 9 in enabling such responses. I
have already mentioned both issues in Part I; in this section I will be
more overt in my application of the framework discussed in Part II.
It would be hard to argue Japan has no threats to its security; a nu-
clear Korean peninsula, for example, is of grave concern. At the same
time, irrespective of the substantive merits for increased military capa-
bility, this argument (that Japan's security needs demand a military
force and Article 9 should therefore be interpreted or amended to allow
it to have one) is not new. Because the argument has been heard before,
it is attenuated by the way in which it has been used and altered in the
past and by the associations those prior uses bring with them. This re-
quires the deliberative groups in Japan to determine whether the
argument reflects society's best judgment about Japan's security needs
or is being put to other uses-not necessarily nefarious uses, but differ-
ent uses nonetheless.
First, the identity of the threat has changed over time. During the
219Cold War, the threat was communism or the arms race. Immediately
after the end of the Cold War, the threat was the instability caused by the
breakdown in the bipolar order, particularly regional and ethnic con-
218. Elster writes, "If the framers try to prevent the constitution from becoming a sui-
cide pact, it may lose its efficacy as a suicide prevention device." ELSTER, supra note 2, at
174 (emphasis in original).
219. For example, the following statement was made at a regional hearing held by the
1957-1964 Constitutional Research Commission:
At a time when we are being threatened by an external force which would deny us
the rights and freedoms recognized in the Constitution of Japan, enjoyed equally
by all the people, and which aims to establish a despotism, we certainly possess
the right to exercise the right of self-defense and to defend with all determination
this Constitution which guarantees the rights and freedoms of the people.
JAPAN'S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 32, at 196.
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22022
flict. Currently, it is terrorism and asymmetric warfare. 22 Each of
these threats may be real and significant, but the question arises as to
what extent the logic driving the security argument almost requires the
selection of a threat to complete its narrative.
Second, the security argument is one of several interrelated argu-
ments made in favor of changes to Article 9. The debate has also been
couched in terms of what is appropriate for a state: why should Japan, as
an independent country, be prohibited from defending itself? This ques-
tion is a precursor to the contemporary argument that Japan should have
a defense system concomitant with a great economic power with a lar-
ger role to play in international affairs.122 In addition, as discussed
221
earlier, there is the argument that Article 9 was forced on Japan. Since
these arguments often appear together, the question arises as to how im-
portant the security issue is in relation to others. Does national security
form the heart of the case for amending Article 9, or is it ancillary to
that case?
Third, recall that Japan's decision to rearm in the 1950s was due in
large part to strong pressure from the United States, which had just
forced Japan to disarm.224 The United States made American bases in
Japan and the establishment of the National Police Force preconditions
for ending the Occupation, and it had a great interest in domestic devel-
opments in post-Occupation Japan. Dower describes the U.S. policy
towards Japan just before its restoration of sovereignty as follows:
(1) to discredit the Japanese left-and the strong movement for
an "over-all peace" based on no rearmament, no American
bases, and Japanese neutrality in the cold war ... (2) to eradi-
cate the strong commitment to pacifism .. . which prevailed
among the Japanese populace at large . . . (3) to woo the Japa-
nese to the capitalist camp by stressing their 'social superiority'
to other Asians .. . (4) to accomplish these goals of
220. See e.g. Remarks Before the House of Councillors Constitutional Research Com-
mission (June 4, 2004)(statement of Hatakeyama Keichi) in Sangiin Kenp6 Ch~sakai ni
okeru Kjutsunin nado Kich6 Hatsugen [Basic Statements of Members of the Public and the
like of the House of Councillors Constitutional Research Commission], at 80-81 (discussing
post-Cold War threats to peace and security, including ethnic conflict and terrorism).
221. Sasajima Masahiko, Jiei no tame no Guntai no Hochi o Meiki [Make Clear the
Maintenance of a Military for Self-Defense], in YOMIURI SHIAN 2004NEN, supra note 116, at
74.
222. KENP6 "KAIsEI" NO STEN, supra note 17, at 21-22 (arguing that in the 1990s,
proponents of amendments used Japan's status as an economic power to justify a larger mili-
tary).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 177-186.
224. See BURUMA, supra note 183, at 156-58 (describing U.S. pressure on Japan to
rearm).
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re-education, or reorientation, by developing appropriate 'psy-
chological programs'....225
Later, Japan was also meant to serve as a democratic counter-
example to communist China.2" This U.S. influence caused critics of
Japan's defense policy in the 1950s and 1960s to argue the decision to
rearm was based not so much on an objective assessment of Japan's se-
221
curity needs as it was on outside pressure.
Fourth, in the early years of the Constitution, there was a genuine
concern that Japan would return to its former militarism, which had
proved disastrous to itself and its neighbors. Arguments based on na-
tional security and appeals to nationalism had been used to justify
Japanese military development and expansion in Asia throughout Ja-
pan's transformation into a modern state. For example, Yamagata
Arimoto, the first prime minister of Japan after the establishment of the
National Diet, argued in 1890 that "a nation without a plan of self-
defense was not a proper nation."2 9 This argument, as I discussed ear-
lier, is used today. For Yamagata, that plan included securing interests
outside of Japan, particularly in Korea. "[Yamagata] talked about secu-
rity, but the rationale of security ... led him to say there could be no
defense without the powers of offense, to support forceful actions in
regions outside of Japan's boundaries, and constantly to broaden the
perimeter of these actions. '23° The security argument thus evokes past
government policies that blurred the lines between defensive and offen-
sive war, policies that led to Japan's almost total destruction.
Finally, assuming Japan does in fact face significant threats to its
security, the issue still remains as to whether Article 9 should be
amended to allow Japan to respond to them. So far I have discussed
these issues as if the question of rearmament is open. Although some
225. John W. Dower, E.H. Norman, Japan and the Uses of History, in ORIGINS OF THE
MODERN JAPANESE STATE: SELECTED WRITINGS OF E.H. NORMAN 3, 41 (John W. Dower ed.,
1975).
226. See id.
227. See, e.g. Kenp6y6go Kokumin Rengo [Citizen's Union for the Protection of the
Constitution], 'Kenp6y6go Kokumin Reng6' Kessei Taikai Sengen, Yoko, Kiyaku ['Citizen's
Union for the Protection of the Constitution' Founding Convention Declaration, Outlines,
Rules] in KENP6 "KAISEI" No S6TEN, supra note 17, at 486 (arguing that the Japanese gov-
ernment is being forced by "'international pressure' from a particular sector (i.e., the United
States) to rearm). In the late 1970s, U.S. pressure on Japan after the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan led to stronger military ties between the two countries. BERGER, supra note 82, at
130-31.
228. See, e.g., Kenpoy6go Kokumin Reng6, supra note 227.
229. Marlene Mayo, Attitudes Towards Asia and the Beginnings of Japanese Empire
reprinted in I THE JAPAN READER: IMPERIAL JAPAN: 1800-1945 212, 215 (Jon Livingston,
Joe Moore, and Felicia Oldfeather eds., Random House 1973).
230. Id. at 216.
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want Japan to dismantle the SDF, a significant number of deliberative
groups accept, at least tacitly, both Japan's right to defend itself and the
SDF's existence. But as Hirose Yoshio observes, the decision to rearm
and allow the United States to maintain bases in Japan, and to interpret
Article 9 to permit this without repealing it completely, represented a
compromise among competing forces. On the one hand, the United
States pressured Japan to rearm, and on the other, Japan desired to focus
on economic development, the Japanese people widely accepted paci-
fism, and Australia and New Zealand were concerned about a rearmed
Japan.231 Hirose notes that the solution reached in the 1950s was just
good enough to balance these competing forces and to enable Japan to
pursue its policy of economic development. At the same time, this com-
promise also led to overdependence on the United States and invited the
current problem of American bases in Okinawa, as well as what Hirose
describes as a rift between the Japanese leadership and the people."'
Article 9 has not only played a role in the rough equilibrium that has
persisted thus far, but it has also affected Japan's understanding of na-
tional security. Japan has relied on the United States for its defense, but
with regard to positive national security initiatives, it has had to rely on
non-military action. Katzenstein observes that Japan's understanding of
national security is a comprehensive one and includes an emphasis on
diplomatic relations, trade relationships, assistance to developing coun-
tries, and humanitarian assistance."' This broader understanding is
borne out by the statements of all major deliberative groups, as well as
the findings of the constitutional research commissions. Keidanren, for
example, supports amendments to Article 9 but also argues that because
Japan lacks natural resources, it is important for the nation's well-being
for it to use diplomatic and economic means to achieve international
peace and stability. The organization thus supports free trade agreements
with Japan's Asian neighbors as well as other economic ties."'
In turn, Article 9 and Japanese conceptions of national security af-
fect the very security situation Japan faces. Theodore McNelley, writing
231. HIROSE YOSHIO, NIHON NO ANZENHOSHO TO SHINSEKAI CHITSUJ6 [Japanese Way
for International Security and a New World Order] 181-83 (1997).
232. Id. at 182-83.
233. KATZENSTEIN, supra note 12, at 3. ("[T]he Japanese definition of security goes far
beyond what American police or military officials would recognize. Japanese officials define
internal and external security in comprehensive terms. They emphasize the social, economic,
and political aspects of security rather than focus more narrowly on explicitly coercive di-
mensions of state policy."). See also Okada, supra note 130, at 5-7, 15-18 (discussion by the
president of Minshut6 of the need for a comprehensive approach to Japanese security);
JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (Akitoshi Miyashita & Yoichiro Sato
eds., 2001) (a collection of essays describing Japan's trade, economic, and assistance poli-
cies and their relationship to foreign policy).
234. Keidanren Position Paper, supra note 115, § 2.
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in the early 1960s, recognized that Article 9 can have a two-fold effect
on world peace and security. On the one hand, it can prevent Japan from
reemerging as a military threat; on the other, it can invite other countries
to threaten Japan.
If Article 9 helps to prevent the recrudescence of irresponsible
militarism in Japan, it will have made a positive contribution to
world peace. On the other hand, if it prevents the development
of the defense forces necessary to deter aggression it may ulti-
mately prove to have served the cause of war rather than that of
235peace.
Thus far, Article 9 and all of its resulting compromises have pre-
served the peace. In addition, although other nations continue to hark
back to Japanese expansionism, they have come to assume that Article 9
represents and affects the long term security policy of Japan, which in
turn has had an impact on how these countries have framed their secu-
rity policies. This result reflects the recursive nature of social tools.
The issue now arises as to whether the rough equilibrium that Arti-
cle 9 had a role in creating has changed so much that Japan's
understanding of national security and Article 9 itself should change.
The answer is not obvious; constitutional provisions governing Japanese
national security will always need to balance domestic priorities, the
demands of the United States, and the worries of Japan's neighbors. Ar-
ticle 9 and Japanese attitudes towards security have helped Japan
perform that balancing act thus far; the question is whether better tools
are available.
D. Incompletely Theorized Agreement and the Imperfections Thereof
Bricolage in a substantive debate on history, constitutional change,
and national security creates difficulties in achieving consensus. The
issue remains, however, as to whether the same array of concepts can be
used to reach incompletely theorized agreement. As discussed earlier, it
seems there is agreement in the Article 9 debate on relatively high levels
of abstraction. All groups believe the renunciation of war contained in
paragraph 1 is a core value to Japanese society, one that has been deeply
internalized and institutionalized. The result has been a more compre-
hensive understanding of national security objectives that encompasses
economic and diplomatic relations in addition to military strength. And,
while it encounters opposition, there seems to be a growing consensus
that Japan either already has or should have the right to use force to de-
235. Theodore McNelly, The Renunciation of War in the Japanese Constitution, 77
POL. SCi. Q. 350, 378 (1962).
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fend itself. Can consensus on this high level help smooth over dis-
agreements about history, about what can be revised in a constitution,
about what Article 9 says or should say, or about what national security
means?
Even those who agree Japan has the right to use force in its defense
disagree on whether Article 9 should be amended to confirm this right.
On the one hand, a group opposing amendments to Article 9 in the be-
lief that it already permits the use of force might support an alteration if
it expects doing so would quell any remaining doubts about the issue,
thus enhancing the legitimacy of the Constitution, Japan's national secu-
rity policy, and the SDF. It might also agree to do so out of concerns that
deliberative groups interpreting Article 9 restrictively will gain more
political power in the future. On the other hand, a group that advocates
amending Article 9 might acquiesce in a decision not to do so as a result
of two beliefs: first, that the current round of debates (over a protracted
amount of time) has solidified current policy, and second, that groups
opposing force and the SDF are on the wane for the foreseeable future.
It is hard to imagine how incompletely theorized agreement can be
reached between groups that advocate the use of force in self-defense by
the SDF and those that oppose such force. As discussed earlier, when
the now defunct JSP formed a coalition government with the LDP in the
1990s, it softened its position on the SDF by calling for gradual instead
of immediate reductions. Perhaps a similar solution will present itself
here. Or, it may be that left-idealist views are held by so few groups
with political power it will be deemed sufficient that the minority posi-
tion has been heard at all.236
Any solution eventually reached will resolve some issues and create
others. One possible solution is to do nothing-it is possible no revi-
sions will result from the current debates, either because of changes in
the Diet or because public opinion has not yet galvanized in favor of
amendments. This would mean the government's interpretation of Arti-
cle 9, including the principle of minimum necessary force, would
control for the foreseeable future. This outcome would in turn have the
effect of justifying the existence of the SDF while leaving open the
236. There is subtle evidence of this even in the House of Councillors Constitutional
Research Commission Final Report. According to the Explanatory Notes, the Final Report
uses a system of underlining and reverse shading to indicate the level of support among the
political parties for a particular position. Positions on which the five parties agree are indi-
cated in bold underlining throughout the text. However, there are also methods of describing
the level of support for issues without taking into account the left-centrist Japanese Commu-
nist and Social Democratic Parties. Positions on which the LDP, Minshuto and the New
Komeito largely agree are indicated in reverse-shading, and issues on which these three par-
ties are divided are indicated by regular underlining. House of Councillors CRC Final
Report, supra note 1, Explanatory Notes (no pagination in original).
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question of its participation in UN peacekeeping operations and prohib-
iting Japan from engaging in collective self-defense.
What the preservation of the status quo would indicate about consti-
tutionalism in Japan is ambiguous. On the one hand, it would allow
those who disagree with the government's interpretation of Article 9 to
argue it has rendered the Constitution an empty shell. That argument has
some traction. One cannot help but notice the jury-rigged feel of the
concept of minimum necessary force, so critical to the government's
interpretation of Article 9. First, it is circular. "[W]ar potential" prohib-
ited in paragraph 2 is defined by fiat as the use of force that rises above
a level minimally necessary for self-defense. Since, in the government's
view, the SDF is never to use force rising above that level, it does not
constitute "war potential" even though it consists of land, air, and sea
forces and in reality has the capacity to project force rising far above the
minimal level. Second, under certain circumstances, the principle would
justify maintaining very large military forces if the threat to Japan were
large enough. The circular and ephemeral nature of minimum necessary
force as a concept and as a substantive limit on the use of force lends
credence to a more restrictive interpretation of Article 9 and raises the
question of how effective the Constitution is in constraining the gov-
ernment.
These conceptual problems in the official interpretation of Article 9
lead some to worry about the public's perception of the government's
security policies and the Constitution. Eto Jun, in a 1983 NHK broad-
cast on the Constitution, was critical of what the government's
interpretation meant to the person on the street:
[The government's position that the SDF is not a force with war
potential means] although ... a person wearing a steel helmet,
carrying a gun, and marching in step looks like a soldier, in real-
ity he is not-he is SDF personnel, that is, just like a mail
carrier or public works bureau employee. A bureaucrat or legal
specialist might understand why one must describe [SDF per-
sonnel] in this way or why one should think in this way, but
common people will not. The resulting perception of confusion,
or feeling of dissonance (kokoro no sukkiri no nai) is, I think, a
huge minus no matter how one values [Article 9].237
This conflict between common-sense understandings of Article 9
and the official position resonates with Hirose's concern, discussed ear-
237. SHUZO HAYASHI ET AL., KENP6 RONS6 [Constitutional Controversies] 50-51
(2005).
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lier, that historically there has been a rift between the public and the
238government on matters of self-defense.
On the other hand, despite the difficulties raised by the official in-
terpretation of Article 9, the concept of minimum self-defense has not
been ineffective as a limit. To state the obvious, Japan has not engaged
in an offensive war since World War II.2" But even on a more technical
and doctrinal level, the government has been fairly consistent in its ap-
proach to Article 9. Yutaka Kawashima makes the following
observations about the legal debate on Article 9:
[T]he government is expected to maintain the legal consistency
of all the answers it has given in past parliamentary debates ....
For example, in [the] parliamentary debate about the interpreta-
tion of the security treaty between Japan and the United States,
responses of government officials some forty years ago have to
be quoted and adhered to.
24 °
Even if the Japanese judiciary had determined that it was appropri-
ate to be more active in the interpretation of Article 9, it is not obvious
that the courts would have achieved a significantly greater level of con-
sistency or cohesion in its jurisprudence than the government has
achieved over the 60-year history of the article.
What about the fact that there is more than one plausible interpreta-
tion of Article 9? There are costs-looming over government policy is
the possibility that it is in violation of the Constitution, which calls into
question both the legitimacy of the policy and the ability of the Consti-
tution to control government action. Yet, as David Engdahl argues, the
lack of definitive interpretations of constitutional provisions sometimes
has rhetorical, educative, and ultimately legitimating potential in civil
238. See supra text accompanying note 231.
239. As Yamauchi argues, Japan has not waged war since World War II, whereas under
the Meiji Constitution, Japan was engaged in a war approximately every 10 years. Yamauchi,
supra note 11, at 39-40. Even absent judiciary input, the balance of powers has had an im-
pact on the executive's application of Article 9. Lori Damrosch argues that the Japanese
legislature and its interpretation of Article 9 have served as a powerful brake on the executive
branch's war powers. Lori Fisler Damrosch, Constitutional Control Over War Powers: A
Common Core of Accountability in Democratic Societies? 50 U. MIAMi L. REv. 181, 196
(1995). As evidence, she points to the serious debates in the Diet in the early 1990s concern-
ing Japan's participation in the first Persian Gulf War and in the United Nations
peacekeeping operations in Cambodia. She argues that such debates resulted in legislation
"that both enabled and constrained Japanese involvement in UN peacekeeping . Id. at
193-94.
240. KAwASHIMA, supra note 21, at 8 (2003). For a detailed discussion of the relative
consistency of the government's interpretation and application of Article 9, in large part
because of the work of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, see John 0. Haley, Waging War:
Japan's Constitutional Constraints (Oct. 2, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://law.wustl.edu/Faculty/workingpapers/haley/wagingwar.pdf).
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society. Ambiguities have the ability to sway precisely because of mul-
tiple interpretations.24 ' As discussed earlier, this has been true of Article
9, as each successive debate over its merits serves to review and ingrain
the values and policies associated with it.14' Even the courts have a role
in this regard. John Haley argues that although it is unlikely that the
courts will ever overturn national defense legislation, litigation is used
as a form of political action to marshal opposition to the SDF or to call
into question its legitimacy.243 The result has been the rough accommo-
dation that Engdahl advocates. 244
To the extent any amendments are made, the war renunciation pro-
vision of paragraph 1 will remain, and paragraph 2 will be amended to
confirm the constitutionality of both the right to use force for self-
defense and the SDF. It is also possible that participation in UN peace-
keeping operations will be confirmed. This approach, if taken, would
codify existing Japanese defense policy and practice, confirming the
constitutionality of the SDF and possibly Japanese military participation
241in UN peacekeeping activities. Such a limited approach has several
advantages. From a domestic perspective, these changes would allow
Japan to maintain, to a large extent, the values and policies embodied in
Article 9, ideals that have enjoyed broad acceptance by Japanese soci-
ety. The Constitution would retain provisions that renounce offensive
warfare as an instrument of foreign policy. In response to the assertion
that Japan continues to rely on the international community for its secu-
rity, such provisions could retain, indeed codify, the principle of
minimum necessary force, continuing the government's 50-year old in-
terpretation. At the same time, such changes would accommodate more
recent developments in Japan's security needs vis-A-vis North Korea and
China and reflect and reinforce Japan's changing self-image as a major
241. David E. Engdahl, John Marshall's "Jeffersonian" Concept of Judicial Review, 42
DUKE L.J. 279, 337 n.205 (1992).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 185-186.
243. HALEY, supra note 73, at 188-89.
244. See supra note 241. This rough accommodation is also evidence of incompletely
theorized agreement on defense matters.
245. As discussed earlier, supra text accompanying notes 19-31, the question of collec-
tive self-defense, particularly with respect to Japan's relationship with the United States
under the US-Japan Mutual Security Agreement remains open. Unless specific limits are put
in place, either in the Constitution, the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Agreement, or in its
guidelines, a revised provision that confirms the constitutionality of Japanese military activi-
ties under the U.S.-Japan security umbrella could open the door to a significant expansion of
those activities. As discussed, under the most recent Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Co-
operation issued in 1997, Japan is already given wider latitude as to where it may engage in
military activities, although such activities are limited in nature. Moreover, as the United
States' definition of permissible acts of self-defense broadens to include preemptive self-
defense, so too Japan may be called on to increase its participation in such activities, and it
will no longer be able to use the Constitution as a means of saying no.
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international actor. Furthermore, since Japan has to a large extent ac-
commodated itself to the SDF and the U.S. security umbrella,
amendments that merely serve to codify the status quo should raise
fewer concerns about legitimacy.
A limited approach would also have advantages from an interna-
tional perspective. If Japan wants to address the concerns of its
neighbors while resolving some of its existing constitutional quandaries,
codifying current practice would appear to be better than repealing Arti-
cle 9 altogether. Japan's current defense policy is already known to other
states and has undoubtedly been factored into their defense policies and
war plans. This approach is preferable to forcing states to predict how
Japan might act based on more open constitutional provisions.
At the same time, a limited approach raises at least three concerns.
First, an acknowledgement that Japan can use force for self-defense will
require additional safeguards to ensure force is used appropriately. At
present, the Constitution provides that the Cabinet Ministers of State
must be ctvillans but does not set out specific procedures for permit-
ting the use of force. (In the minds of some, this fact supports an
argument that Article 9 prohibits the use of force for even self-defense.)
Instead, the Self-Defense Force Law governs decisions to authorize
247force. Since most of these procedures are set out in legislation, one
issue to be resolved is whether provisions governing the use of force
248
should be written into the Constitution.
The second issue is whether a provision that both affirms and limits
Japan's right to use force for self-defense would be meaningful. On the
one hand, some want the principle of minimum necessary force codified
in the Constitution. As discussed earlier, the concept has been criticized
246. KENP5, art. 66, para. 2.
247. Jieitai H6 [Self-Defense Force Law], Law No. 165 of 1954, arts. 7-9. Under Arti-
cle 41 of the Constitution, the Diet is the highest organ of state power. Kenp6, supra note 6,
art. 41. Executive power is vested in the Cabinet, which is headed by the Prime Minister. Id.
art. 65-66. The Cabinet is collectively responsible to the Diet. Id. art. 66. Under the current
command structure established by statute, the Defense Agency is a part of the Office of the
Prime Minister. The head of the Defense Agency, the Director General, has the status of
minister of state. She is directly under the control of the Prime Minister. The Director Gen-
eral is the head of the SDF, as well as two other "civilian" arms of the agency, consisting of
various internal bureaus and the Defense Facilities Administration. Japan Defense Agency,
Outline of Defense Agency and SDF, at http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_.htm (last visited Oct.
3, 2005); Global Security.org. supra note 13. In emergencies, the Prime Minister is author-
ized to deploy the SDF, subject to approval of the Diet. Such approval can be retroactive. Id.
As a means of maintaining civilian control over the armed forces, heads of important internal
bureaus such as defense policy, budget, and equipment are often headed by civilians from
other government ministries. Id.
248. For a discussion of the international community's interest in constitutional provi-
sions that govern the use of force, see Lori Fisler Damrosch, Constitutional Control Of
Military Actions: A Comparative Dimension, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1991).
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for its circularity and for potentially justifying significant levels of
force. On the other hand, flawed as the principle is, codification in the
Constitution would enhance its legitimacy. Furthermore, it would be
inaccurate to say that the concept has no value as a restraint: first, as
discussed earlier, the Diet has required successive administrations to
remain consistent in their interpretation and application of Article 9, and
second, minimum self-defense, according to the government, does not
allow Japan to engage in collective self-defense.
The third issue is whether, down the line, a limited approach would
simply give rise to the same kind of constitutional issues that plague
Article 9 now. Limited revisions might satisfactorily address the current
issues regarding the SDF, participation in peacekeeping operations, and
even collective self-defense, but they may not anticipate unforeseen
challenges to Japan's security and its international relations. As Japan
responds to those challenges, it could find itself hampered by constitu-
tional provisions meant to address earlier situations. If Japan's past
experience with Article 9 is any indication of future behavior, it may
well adopt policies that again raise constitutional issues. Although it is
possible the current focus on revisions to the Constitution marks a new
trend in Japanese constitutionalism in which revisions will be made
more often, it is more likely that new revisions to the Constitution will
be long in coming. The result would be yet another debate about the
constitutionality of Japan's defense practices under the revised Constitu-
tion.
At present, it seems a complete repeal of Article 9 is unlikely. Nev-
ertheless, it would have the advantages of addressing the current issues
raised by Article 9 and avoiding similar constitutional issues that could
arise with more limited revisions. As discussed earlier, however, al-
though Japanese public opinion towards defense matters has shifted
somewhat in the recent past, a substantial portion of the Japanese public
continues to embrace the values embodied in Article 9. It could be ar-
gued such values will persist even if the Constitution does not directly
renounce the use of force, particularly since such ideals would likely
remain embodied in the preamble. Regardless, the repeal of the renun-
ciation of war would have great symbolic impact, and it is unclear that a
complete repeal would garner the required two-thirds vote in both
houses of the Diet and a majority vote in a referendum approving such a
measure. Finally, although complete repeal would free Japan to become
a more active participant in its security relationship with the United
States without the difficulties of accommodating that relationship with
more limited amendments, Japan's neighbors, notably China, Russia,
[Vol. 27:55
Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan
and North and South Korea, would be more alarmed by a complete re-
249peal than by a limited one.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In Japanese Law, Mark Ramseyer and Minoru Nakazato try to
explain various facets of Japanese law by examining the ways in which
Japanese people, faced with specific economic and social needs, have
found rational solutions to those challenges. They imply that it is mis-
leading to try to identify a common thread that runs through all of
Japanese law.21 The idea that Japanese law and its role in wider Japa-
nese society cannot be reduced to a few generalizations has been widely
accepted. Scholars like Frank Upham, for example, have debunked the
252
myth of Japanese aversion to litigation. Like any modem society, Ja-
pan attempts to address a number of social issues; law is one strategy to
deal with them-on the individual level, through the various laws and
practices that regulate family and economic life, as well as on a broader
societal level. At the same time, other scholars observe how Japan has
used law as an ordering principle in ways that have persisted over time.
Thus, Haley, fully aware of the dangers of lapsing into arguments for
251Japanese exceptionalism, can nevertheless trace through Japan's his-
tory the pattern in which Japanese elites have separated the institutions
of authority and power.254 He also observes a distinct but not unique way• • • 255
of obtaining consensus to legitimate policy decisions. So too have
other scholars described the particular ways in which Japan has both
256
accepted and transmuted the concept of civil rights.
249. Japan could declare it is not permitted to use force even in self-defense, but this
does not seem likely. In addition, some have argued Japan should declare permanent neutral-
ity. See e.g. House of Councillors CRC Remarks of Experts, supra note 5, at 294 (remarks of
Ueda Katsumi).
250. J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORu NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC AP-
PROACH (1999).
251. Id. at xi.
252. FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987). Upham
shows litigation has been used in Japan to address important social issues, such as environ-
mental protection, employment, and civil rights. At the same time, when some issues, such as
the environment are involved, private actions have been largely subsumed by administrative
responses to those issues, in large part, so the government can continue to exercise control
over them.
253. HALEY, supra note 81, at xv.
254. HALEY, supra note 73.
255. HALEY, supra note 81, at 16-17.
256. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Chrysanthemum, the Sword, and the
First Amendment: Disentangling Culture, Community, and Freedom of Expression, 1998 Wis.
L. REV. 905 (1998); Christopher A. Ford, The Indigenization of Constitutionalism in the
Japanese Experience, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 3 (1996); Beer, supra note 174.
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My examination of Article 9 in the light of the work of Elster, Sun-
stein, Balkin, and others suggests one should not be surprised to observe
a set of solutions to societal issues that is both compatible with any
number of cultures and a distinct collection of repertoires and concepts
used to achieve consensus among the various deliberative groups influ-
ential in national policy decisions. This has been the case with Article 9:
the various deliberative groups and their particular positions on the arti-
cle, the use of the constitutional research commissions as a preliminary
stage in the deliberation process, and the nature of the substantive argu-
ments for and against amendments to the article demonstrate the work
of bricolage that impacts all institutional and conceptual tools.
I have also shown how the narratives and concepts that form part of
the debate make consensus challenging. From the process thus far, how-
ever, Japanese society appears to recognize agreement on relatively high
levels of abstraction concerning Japan's commitment to peace, the need
for Japan to be able to defend itself (although there is a significant dis-
senting view), and its understanding of national security. The question is
whether agreement on this abstract level will enable the various groups
in Japan to compromise on other more contentious issues, such as
whether Article 9 needs to be amended or simply reinterpreted and
whether Japan should be able to exercise the right to collective self-
defense. Irrespective of the final outcome, the Japanese experience pro-
vides an important example of how a democracy uses its constitution as
a means of self-governance and consent.
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